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FOREWORD
In the summer of 2008, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev urged the West to join Moscow in creating
a new European security system. The existing one no
longer provided stability on the Continent; indeed,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
eastward expansion had created a new rancorous fault
line between the West and Russia. Before Medvedev’s
Plan became the subject of serious discourse, the August
War in Georgia erupted, and Russia’s aggression was
cited as evidence that any notion of security cooperation with Moscow was a fantasy.
By the fall, however, the war was cited as a
compelling reason for engaging Russia since it made
little sense to isolate the largest country in Europe
from any meaningful security agenda. What is more,
President Barack Obama proclaimed that finding a
follow-up for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) was vital to U.S. security to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and fissile material to rogue states
and terrorist cells that might employ them against an
American city. A successful outcome to the START
negotiations would help reconcile other outstanding
flashpoints of conflict between the West and Russia:
the American anti-missile system in Eastern Europe;
the issue of NATO enlargement; and resurrecting
conflict management mechanisms in what Russia called its “near abroad,” and Europe labeled its “troubled
neighborhood.” Cooperation on other vital security
issues also would be advanced: energy security, climate
change, and the creation of a new global economic
regime.
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It is against this backdrop that Medvedev’s
proposal has been revisited and, while some Western
analysts deem the conflicting interests and value gap
that separate the West from Russia overwhelming,
others argue that the time has come to engage Russia
in seeking a common security agenda in Europe. That
said, the most compelling question confronting those
who favor a security partnership with Russia is: How
to give Russia a voice but not a veto in a new European
security system?
In this monograph, Dr. Richard Krickus addresses
this question and provides some provocative recommendations. Most specifically, he proposes that
the time has come to provide Russia with a NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP) and agrees that
those who argue against it remain mired in a Cold
War mindset that is out of sync with today’s strategic
realities. Ultimately, a campaign to include Russia in
NATO may fail but at the very least, the endeavor
deserves serious consideration he believes. He also
provides compelling reasons why U.S. defense analysts
must consider several future outcomes for Russia.
In addition to being the only state that is capable of
devastating the United States in a nuclear exchange,
most of the world’s population and resources exist on
the borders of its massive territory. Its future then, will
shape the global strategic environment for decades to
come.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto
in crafting a new European security system? This
question has preoccupied analysts in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington ever since Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one
was deeply flawed. Vladimir Putin’s protégé observed
last summer that the American “unipolar moment”
upon which it rested was over. The United States could
no longer dominate the international agenda nor could
NATO do the same thing in Europe.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide insight
into the problems and prospects of the United States
and Europe creating a new security relationship with
Russia—one that can enhance the national security of
all three of them. It will be comprised of three parts.
First, it will address several compelling questions: What
is the Russian case for a new security system? What are
the arguments in opposition to it? And why, in spite
of profound reservations about cooperation with Moscow, are Western statesmen prepared to consider it?
In this connection, the factors that prevented a nuclear
war between the Soviet Union and the West will provide a framework for our analysis: in sum, the triangular
relationship between deterrence, arms control, and
conflict management.
Second, points of conflict between the Western
alliance on the one hand and Russia on the other will
be assessed: for example, friction associated with
NATO, its eastward enlargement in particular; a U.S.
missile defense system in Eastern Europe; the future of
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and
the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE); and of most urgent significance the need to
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reconfigure the strategic nuclear balance between
Washington and Moscow by providing a new START.
Third, conclusions and recommendations will be
provided that have a bearing on how the United States
should respond to Medvedev’s proposal and other
issues associated with efforts to integrate Russia into the
Western security system. A number of issues that will
determine whether this campaign succeeds or fails will
be assessed. For example, much has been said about a
value gap that separates the West and Russia but little
about differences within the Trans-Atlantic alliance
and the European Union that will have a profound
impact upon the prospects for security cooperation
among the three partners. This assessment will provide
insight into the compelling question: How to provide
Russia with a voice but not a veto in crafting a new
Trans-Atlantic security system? In this connection, the
answer will involve a step-by-step process that rests
upon renegotiating the START which expires at the
end of this year. It also will investigate an initiative
that borders on the unthinkable for most American
defense analysts: providing Russia with a MAP for
NATO membership.
This recommendation represents a minority view,
but there is mounting support for it as it is apparent
that the time has come to think beyond the Cold War
worldview that has restrained bold new thinking
about the West’s relationship with Russia. The wars
in the Greater Middle East, of course, now preoccupy
American strategists, but they cannot lose sight of the
following observations: Russia is the only country
capable of devastating the United States in a nuclear
attack; major American security priorities cannot be
achieved without its cooperation; and most of the
world’s people and resources exist in and around
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its territory. Changes that occur within it will have
profound consequences for American global military
planning, and they deserve our close attention.
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MEDVEDEV’S PLAN:
GIVING RUSSIA A VOICE BUT NOT A VETO
IN A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto
in crafting a new European security system? This
question has preoccupied analysts on both sides of
the Atlantic ever since Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one was
deeply flawed and had to be replaced. Vladimir Putin’s
protégé observed in a series of speeches last summer
that the American “unipolar moment” upon which it
rested was over, and the United States could no longer
dominate the international agenda.1 At the same time,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
a relic of the Cold War and incapable of addressing
existing and anticipated flash points of conflict on the
Continent. How could the existing security system
function when it excluded Russia—the largest country
in Europe—and surrounded it with a curtain of steel
on its western frontier?
Medvedev’s proposal—some called it a doctrine—
was favorably received on both sides of the Atlantic,
albeit with reservations and active opposition in some
quarters.2 The prospects for such cooperation were
abruptly placed in a deep-freeze after the RussianGeorgian War in August 2008. Within days Russian
troops overwhelmed the American-trained Georgian
forces, expelling them from the break-away South
Ossetian enclave, and pushing the overmatched
defenders into the Georgian heartland. At one point
it appeared that the Russians were about to occupy
Tbilisi and depose Mikhail Saakashvilli, the Georgian
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president, from power. Putin reviled the man and said
that under no circumstances would he negotiate with
him. Georgia started the war and after its “peacekeepers” were killed, Russia had no option but to safeguard
its embattled troops. The Georgian side had committed
thousands of civilian atrocities through indiscriminate
air and artillery attacks upon South Ossetia’s capital,
Tskhinvali.3
Even after Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President—
who was occupying the European Union (EU)
revolving executive—signed a ceasefire agreement
with Medvedev, there was no quick Russian exit from
Georgia. Not only did the Russian army take its time
leaving the country, it continued to destroy civilian
installations and infrastructure that had nothing to do
with Georgia’s military. In a massive public diplomacy
campaign, Moscow asserted that the Georgians had
killed tens of thousands of people and had engaged
in brutal atrocities. Since these claims were excessive,
the Kremlin undermined other charges that they were
leveling against Saakashvilli; namely, that he had
started the war.
The George W. Bush administration condemned
Russia’s military actions but added that it had warned
Saakashvilli against a forceful seizure of South Ossestia
even though it legally belonged to Georgia, and Russian
“peacekeepers” had no right under international law to
remain there or in Abkhazia—a second enclave whose
residents wished to be independent of Georgian rule.
The Western reaction to the war, however, became
muted when reports surfaced that, while Moscow
had tricked Saakashvilli into his intemperate action
and used it as a pretext to invade Georgia, there was
mounting evidence that Georgia, and not Russia, started the war. Indeed, Saakashvilli later conceded this
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point after Georgia’s former Ambassador to Russia,
Erosi Kitsmarishvilli, made this claim in public.4 This
led to further probes into Saakashvilli’s rule, and
the results were not favorable to him. Among other
things, his credentials as a democrat had been sullied
by his use of force in 2007 to silence political critics
within Georgia, while his government had neutralized
independent news outlets. As Western opinion turned
against him, a number of American and European
observers concluded that it would be reckless to invite
Georgia into NATO and run the risk of a military
confrontation with Russia.
Nonetheless, opponents of Medvedev’s proposal
cited the Five Day War as evidence that any security
partnership with Moscow was a fantasy. On the
contrary, the time had come to reconsider Russia as a
military threat to European peace. In wake of Russia’s
brutal actions in Georgia, this was the conclusion of
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General
John Craddock, who rejected the notion that “after the
Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact no borders were under threat in Europe
and Eurasia. I think that assumption has proven false.”
He added that the Five Day War and Russian disruption
of gas supplies early in 2009 “. . . suggests their [Russia’s]
overall intent may be to weaken European solidarity
and systematically reduce U.S. influence.”5
This view was popular among the so-called states
of New Europe, that is, the former Soviet Republics and
satellites in Eastern Europe. They had been complaining
for some time that Russia had been exploiting its
energy wealth to compromise their sovereignty.6 For
them, an effort to engage Russia as a security partner
was a dangerous and incomprehensible notion. In
Western (or Old) Europe, by contrast, the focus was
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upon finding ways to reconcile Russian concerns
about what Moscow called its “near abroad,” that is,
the former Soviet entities that now belonged to NATO
and the EU as well as those like Georgia and Ukraine
that were being actively courted by the West. Officials
in Brussels spoke of the territory they occupied as
“Europe’s troubled neighborhood” and, given its close
ties to Moscow, it was risky to meddle in the affairs of
the people living there.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin had concluded there
was no hope of engaging the Bush administration in
discussions of common security. Ever since President
Bush terminated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, officials in Moscow deemed that goal a dead
end. Therefore they looked hopefully for a new
administration in Washington. Since Senator John
McCain had indicated that he would take a tough line
with Moscow they welcomed the election of Barack
Obama.7 The Democratic candidate pledged that, if
elected, he would reengage Russia, especially in the
vital area of strategic arms control.
A month after the new administration entered
office, Vice-President Joseph Biden traveled to Munich
and announced that the Obama administration was
prepared to push the “reset” button with Russia.
Then in April, President Obama met with his Russian
counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, at the G-20 economic
summit in London, United Kingdom (UK). In a jointstatement, they proclaimed:
“. . . the era when our countries viewed each other
as enemies is long over, and recognizing our many
common interests, we today established a substantive
agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed
over the coming months and years. We are resolved
to work together to strengthen strategic stability,
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international security, and jointly meet contemporary
global challenges, while also addressing disagreements
openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and
acknowledgment of each other’s perspective.”8

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that
would expire in December was highlighted along
with related efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, like
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would be
reconsidered in 2010. Other security issues designated
as part of the American-Russian agenda were the war
in Afghanistan and the dispute over the deployment
of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. In the
final draft of their communiqué, the two presidents
concluded: “We the leaders of Russia and the United
States are ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities
and chart a fresh start in relations between our
countries.”9
Obama had a compelling reason to reengage Russia;
for unquestionably he had been warned by his security
team his first day in office that the greatest threat to
the United States was a rogue regime gaining access
to a nuclear weapon or a terrorist cell securing nuclear
material. Either way, tens of thousands of Americans
could be killed in a single strike. His Russian counterpart had to consider the plausibility of a similar
threat, so both had powerful incentives to cooperate.
Moreover, since Russia and the United States together
possessed 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons,
they were in a unique position to check their spread
along with fissile material. By securing the strategic
nuclear balance that prevailed throughout the Cold
War, Washington and Moscow could provide a
framework to deny enemy fanatics the opportunity to
subject them to such an unthinkable outcome.

5

But there were many barriers to a security
partnership. In addition to a climate of distrust and
mutual suspicion that characterized AmericanRussian relations during the Bush years, plus the Five
Day War, there were flash points of conflict that could
sabotage this undertaking. In Europe, they included
NATO enlargement toward Russia, the U.S. antimissile system in Europe, and conflict over the fate of
the countries in the near-abroad that were linked to the
existing arms limitation and crisis prevention regimes;
that is, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) arrangements.
Still, maintaining a balance in the American-Russian
nuclear strategic relationship was of overriding interest
to both Washington and Moscow. Consequently, the
expiration of START that had codified the relationship
ever since it was signed in 1991 had taken center stage. It
would expire by the end of 2009 and, if no replacement
was found for it, the prospect of a new strategic nuclear
arms race could not be foreclosed.
Proponents of a new European security system
look hopefully toward START for another reason. If
the nuclear super-powers found a replacement for the
treaty, it was anticipated that a new environment of
harmony would materialize and advance efforts to
reconcile differences over National Missile Defense
(NMD), NATO enlargement, and other issues that
were linked to the creation of a new European security
system. Conversely, an abortive START initiative
would foster an environment in which security cooperation between the West and Russia was highly
unlikely.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide
insight into the problems and prospects of America
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and Europe creating a new security relationship with
Russia—one that can enhance the national security
of all three of them. In the process it may be possible
to find the answer to the question, How do we give
Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European
security system? It will be comprised of three parts:
• First, it will address several compelling
questions: What is the Russian case for a new
security system? What are the arguments in
opposition to it? And why, in spite of profound
reservations about cooperation with Moscow,
are Western leaders prepared to consider it?
In this connection, the factors that prevented
a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and
the West will provide a framework for our
analysis: in sum, the triangular relationship
between deterrence, arms control, and conflict
management.
• Second, points of conflict between the Western
alliance on the one hand and Russia on the other
will be assessed: for example, friction associated
with NATO, its eastward enlargement in
particular; a U.S. missile defense system in
Eastern Europe; the future of CFE and OSCE;
and a bid to recalibrate the strategic nuclear
balance between Washington and Moscow
through a START follow-up agreement.
• Third, conclusions and recommendations will
be provided that have a bearing on how the
United States should respond to Medvedev’s
proposal and other issues associated with efforts
to integrate Russia into the Western security
system. A number of issues determining whether
the campaign succeeds will be evaluated. For
example, much has been said about a value gap
that separates the West and Russia but little
7

about differences within the Trans-Atlantic
alliance and the EU that will have a profound
impact upon the prospects for security
cooperation among the three partners.
It is against this backdrop that this monograph
will provide insight into the compelling question:
How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto in
crafting a new European security system? The answer
will involve a step-by-step process that rests upon
a successful outcome to the START negotiations. It
will also require a bold new approach to a security
partnership between the West and Russia. Toward
this end, it will investigate an initiative that borders on
the unthinkable for most American defense analysts:
providing Russia with a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) for NATO membership.
Addressing all of the matters cited above is a
daunting undertaking, but the Cold War provides us
with a framework to consider them, namely, a nuclear
holocaust was avoided as a consequence of three
interrelated circumstances:
1. Achieving a stable military balance through
deterrence. Perhaps the single most important reason
why a nuclear holocaust was avoided was the conviction that neither side could attack the other without
risking a lethal retaliatory “second strike” in return.
This was the basis for the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) and a stunning example of
counterintuitive logic: The security of the superpowers
was based upon their vulnerability to a nuclear attack.
Some strategists on both sides rejected MAD and
argued that it was insane to adhere to it. For example,
Richard Pipes, who served in Reagan’s National
Security Council as the administration’s Russian
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expert, wrote in what would become a leading neoconservative organ, Commentary, that the Soviet
military did not accept the logic of MAD. On the
contrary, they believed that a nuclear war could be
fought and won. This meant that the United States had
to adopt the same posture and take this observation to
its logical conclusion to achieve a condition of nuclear
dominance or absolute security.10 Clearly there were
some in the Kremlin who rejected MAD, but Mikhail
Gorbachev was not one of them. Nor, in the final
analysis, did Ronald Reagan see nuclear weapons as
useful instruments of war as he indicated in his second
4 years in office. He felt so strongly about this matter that
at his meeting with Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October
1986, he was prepared to discuss the destruction of all
nuclear weapons. Indeed, as Michael R. Beschloss and
Strobe Talbott have observed, Reagan saw MAD as a
“suicide pact”; he was an abolitionist when it came to
nuclear weapons. “Americans who voted for Reagan in
1980 had little idea that on this issue they were electing
a radical, a heretic, an idealist, a romantic, a nuclear
abolitionist.”11 While the debate over the wisdom
of MAD still persists, the record suggests that it did
foreclose a nuclear disaster during the Cold War. As
we will observe below, this issue is upper-most in the
minds of Russian strategists for they have good reason
to conclude that the United States not only enjoys a
huge conventional military advantage over them, but
a plausible argument can be made that trend lines
indicate that the United States is also moving ahead of
them in strategic nuclear capabilities. That projection
may be challenged, but there is no doubt that the
Kremlin leadership deems it plausible and it does not
serve U.S. interests to leave them with that unsettling
thought.
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2. Creating an environment of trust was
accomplished through a series of arms control
agreements during the Cold War. They placed limits
on both nuclear weapons and their delivery systems
and rested on the notion that there was no such thing as
absolute security. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in the winter of 1979 foreclosed further progress on
this front. But in 1987, President Reagan and his Soviet
counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, ended a dispute
over the Soviet deployment of intermediate-ranged
SS-20s by outlawing all weapons of this nature with
the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
Treaty (INF). This breakthrough provided the basis
for the signing of START and other efforts to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons as exemplified by the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative.
In 2002, the younger Bush signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) and took other measures
with Russia to address the problems of nuclear
proliferation even though the Kremlin deemed them
inadequate. Proponents of reengaging the Russians
on these matters therefore can cite all of the above as
evidence that a security partnership between the West
and Russia is not a doomed undertaking. Today, of
course, the major arms control objective of Washington
and Moscow is to find a replacement for START. The
roadblocks to an agreement are many, but to date both
sides have been meeting on a consistent basis and the
negotiations have been characterized as positive and
serious. A successful outcome to the talks will make
it easier to address other flash-points of conflict in
Europe, but should it fail, it could foster a climate of
enmity that would further exacerbate them.
3. A third component of the regime that prevented
a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was the
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successful management of crises that could spawn a
nuclear showdown. The Berlin Crisis of the early 1960s
and the even more dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis
were successfully managed. The ability to manage
such crises was critical since few defense analysts
believed a nuclear war would start with a strike from
the blue. Instead, they were convinced that one could
erupt as a result of an accident, miscalculation, or
some unforeseen circumstance in the Third World. For
example, allies or puppets of both sides would engage
in conflict such as the 1973 October War between the
Arabs and Israel and result in a nuclear showdown
between the West and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). Today, disputes over NATO
enlargement and the deployment of a U.S. missile
system in Eastern Europe could sabotage efforts to
create a common security regime; so could new fighting
between Georgia and Russia. At the same time, how
both sides reach agreements on the future of CFE and
OSCE will have a bearing on their capacity to achieve
security cooperation. They represent the only politicalmilitary agreements that include both NATO and all of
the former Warsaw Pact members, and in their absence
it may be impossible to avoid a clash between NATO
and Russia in this troubled neighborhood populated
by countries suffering from economic and political
upheaval—namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine. It is apparent that
a new crisis management regime is required in Europe,
and it is the thesis of this monograph that this objective
will not be accomplished short of giving Russia a voice
in a new European Security System (ESS). Indeed, it
will also be proposed that the best way to achieve that
objective is to offer Russia a NATO Membership Action
Plan.
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MEDVEDEV PROPOSAL
What are the prospects for a new security relationship between the West and Russia in Europe?
Medvedev’s proposal and President Obama’s pledge to
press the reset button with Russia has prompted a vast
outpouring of publications to answer this question.12
Toward this end, a trinity of critical questions has been
addressed: What case does Russia make for Medvedev’s
initiative? What arguments have surfaced in the West
in opposition to it? And what should be the Western
reaction to Medvedev’s proposal?
On February 10, 2007, in a gathering of world
leaders, journalists, and foreign policy analysts at
Munich, Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin
raised eyebrows when he forthrightly proclaimed that
Russia would no longer tolerate American domination
of a unipolar world where it reigned as “sovereign.”
The American hegemon had abused its powers
globally and was “plunging the world into an abyss
of permanent conflicts.”13 Up to this point, he and
his Kremlin associates had issued similar words but
primarily within Russia. So why did he make them
before such a prominent gathering that guaranteed
they would be covered by the global media? The
answer was threefold: First, Bush’s War in Iraq and the
troubled occupation of that country had overstretched
America’s military and diminished its moral authority
among the international community. Second, in the
last years of Putin’s presidency, Russia experienced
a financial windfall through the sale of its abundant
natural gas and petroleum wealth. Third, like his Soviet
predecessors, the former KGB operative controlled
the Russian state without viable political opposition
but, unlike them, he enjoyed unparalleled popularity

12

among the Russian people. With a solid political
base and a surging hydrocarbon economy, Putin was
prepared to tell the world that “Russia is back!”
Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000 provided
Russia with new confidence as the young and resolute
ex-KGB agent took over and brought members of the
security community—the Siloviki—with him into the
Kremlin. Nonetheless, they anxiously anticipated the
George W. Bush presidency, for soon after occupying
the White House, Bush scrapped the 1972 ABM Treaty—
one of the major treaties negotiated during the Golden
Age of arms control. At the same time, a chilling signal
was sent to Russia that the neo-conservatives who were
filling important positions in the Bush administration
had rejected arms control as a U.S. priority and instead
embraced the notion of “absolute security.” In sum,
from Moscow’s vantage point they rejected MAD
doctrine in favor of a posture of nuclear dominance.
The younger Bush excised the ABM Treaty to make
way for a national missile defense system, and this
move was consistent with the quest for what appeared
to be an American drive for absolute security—a goal
that his predecessors had deemed impossible.
As a consequence of the September 11, 2001
(9/11) attacks, the Russians reasoned that the Bush
administration might henceforth concede that even
the all-powerful American leviathan needed friends to
defeat its jihadist enemies. The global terrorist threat
clearly demonstrated that only a multilateral solution
to it made any sense. Besides, Putin was the first world
leader to offer his condolences to Bush and to provide
U.S. access to former Soviet bases in Central Asia, while
Moscow used its influence with friends in Afghanistan
to help the American special forces defeat the Taliban
and al-Qaeda jihadists in less than a month of combat.
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It was only after Bush snubbed Russia and his
French and German allies, and launched a preemptive
war against Iraq, that Putin became a vocal critic of
America’s war on terrorism. His military commanders
also were stunned by Bush’s justification for the war,
especially when all of the reasons why it was deemed
legitimate failed to materialize. Here was compelling
evidence that the Americans were exploiting unrivalled
military prowess to achieve their major foreign policy
priorities. Even if the radicals in the White House had
no intention of launching a preemptive first strike
against Russia—in no small part because they could not
take the risk that it was incapable of responding with
a second, albeit diminished, strike—Bush and his team
of hawkish unilateralists could promote their bellicose
geo-political agenda, and no one could prevent them
from doing so.
Bush also implemented plans first adopted by the
Clinton administration to advance NATO up to the
very borders of Russia. This was in violation of the
elder Bush’s pledge to Moscow not to deploy Western
military assets on the territory of the new member
states. Russians therefore asked: If the Cold War was
over and with it the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact,
what was NATO’s purpose? The answer they found
was a disturbing one, for it rested on the conviction
that the West was trying to surround Russia with a
“curtain of steel.” This would happen in 2004 after
the Baltic States were included in a second round of
enlargement. To make matters worse, the Balts refused
to abide by revisions in the CFE treaty that were
adopted in 1999 at Istanbul. Like the United States, they
contended that Moscow was in violation of CFE when
it refused to withdraw its peacekeepers from Georgia
and Moldova. Here again, the West was adhering to
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a set of double standards at Russia’s expense because
NATO now possessed a gray zone that did not comply
with CFE.
Meanwhile, the Americans encouraged Georgia
and Ukraine, through their “colored revolutions,” to
join NATO, and set about achieving closer relations
with the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia,
providing the Kremlin further cause for alarm. In
addition to their lust for the region’s energy assets, the
Americans hoped to secure military bases in the area.
Here was additional proof that the United States was
intent upon the military encirclement of Russia. Most
alarming of all was the conclusion that Washington
was set upon achieving regime change in Russia itself.
In this connection, Moscow portrayed the OSCE—
that sent monitors to evaluate elections in former Soviet
entities—as a Trojan horse, a weapon the Americans
wielded in the hope of promoting regime change in
Russia. This was the rationale for Putin closing down
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were
funded by Western organizations, presumably the same
ones that had helped elect pro-Western governments
in Georgia and Ukraine.
Many independent Russian commentators, like
Dmitry Trenin, who often rejected Kremlin policies,
found much to agree with this prognosis. In conclusion,
Russia no longer wished to be part of the West, but it
was a mistake to confuse it with the USSR of yesterday.
There was no messianic ideology driving Russia’s
moves, and it would cooperate with the West on some
matters like fighting terrorism. In spite of its resurgence,
Russia was not likely “to become a second Soviet Union
. . . not a revanchist and imperialist aggressor bent on
reabsorbing its former provinces. . . . Russia may not be
pro-Western, but neither is it anti-Western.” The West
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must calm down and adopt a pragmatic “issue-based”
approach to Moscow.14
Trenin made these observations 2 years before
the August War, but he proved prescient when he
predicted that Western-Russian relations were likely to
get worse before they improved. Among other things,
he noted that Kosovo’s independence—giving the
Muslim Albanians an independent state at the expense
of a pro-Russian Slavic country, Serbia—would serve
as a template for Russia’s approach to conflict in
Georgia and Moldova. It was in line with this narrative
that Putin delivered caustic anti-American remarks
in Munich in February 2007. What is more, the West
under American leadership had humiliated Russia
while ignoring its legitimate concerns about foreign
troops approaching its borders.
In May, Dmitry Medvedev was elected Russia’s
president, and from the outset some Russian-watchers
pondered whether he would adopt a softer approach
to the West. Others rejected that notion as wishful
thinking. After all, Medvedev was a long-time aide to
Putin, and his adopting a less confrontational approach
to the United States was a ruse. He merely was playing
the good cop to his predecessor’s adopting the tough
cop role. Still, Medevev’s talk about reasserting the
rule of law in Russia and other liberal policies forced
Western observers to recall that Putin’s 2007 Munich
speech was not merely dripping with anti-American
venom. It had provided a second major message that
was all but ignored by critics when it first surfaced: That
is, Putin welcomed the opportunity to work with the
United States to reduce nuclear weapons. Specifically,
he urged both sides to adhere to the NPT scheduled to be
reviewed in 2010. He went on to cite weapons in space
(Star Wars) as a threat to the peace and said, “Plans
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to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defense
system to Europe cannot help but disturb us.” Putin
added to his list of concerns the CFE as revised in 1999.
He then turned his attention to NATO enlargement. “I
think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have
any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself
or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it
represents a serious provocation that reduces the level
of mutual trust.”15 In remarks following his speech, he
indicated that Russia might withdraw from both the
CFE and the INF agreements since both had outlived
their usefulness; the West was exploiting the first at
Russia’s expense, and unnamed neighboring countries
were doing the same thing as they deployed their own
intermediate-ranged missiles.
After he replaced Putin as Russia’s president,
Medvedev joined his Prime Minister in declaring that
the American unipolar moment was over. The postSoviet years when the Americans could dictate to the
world were history in no small part because Bush’s
invasion and occupation of Iraq had proven to be a
colossal disaster. In addition to the 4,000 plus deaths
suffered in the fighting, some economists estimated
the Iraq War (and the unfinished war in Afghanistan)
would cost the American taxpayer something in the
neighborhood of three trillion dollars.16 Bogged down
in Iraq, and facing another disaster in Afghanistan,
the American military did not have the capacity to
honor the threats that the Bush administration and its
neo-conservative cheerleaders persisted in making—
consequently, the Mullahs in Iran who were being
threatened by Washington for their quest to develop
a nuclear arsenal, greeted such saber-rattling with a
yawn.
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In his Berlin speech, Medvedev spoke about an
opportunity “to build up genuine cooperation between
Russia, the EU and North America as the three
branches of European civilization.”17 In an October
8, 2008, address at the World Policy Conference
in Evian, France, he said that the Georgian crisis
demonstrated “that the international security system
based on unipolarity no longer works.”18 In its “desire
to consolidate its global rule,”19 Washington promoted
an independent Kosovo, scrapped the ABM treaty,
and prepared to deploy a missile system in Eastern
Europe. Talk about Ukrainian and Georgian NATO
membership was a further provocation. Nonetheless,
“we are open to cooperation. And we intend to
cooperate responsibly and pragmatically.”20 The
damage done to such cooperation by the August War
was not fatal or irreversible. Yet clearly the August
events demonstrated that NATO was incapable of
serving as Europe’s security infrastructure for it failed
to prevent the Russian-Georgian War. An alternative
Euro-Atlantic system had to be inclusive and without
zones of influence. Toward this end, he provided five
guiding principles which included abiding by the rule
of law, rejecting the use of force to settle disputes, and
other generalities that no one would reject. What was
missing was a roadmap that demonstrated how a new
security system for Europe could be established.21
While Medvedev’s proposal was eviscerated by
many Western foreign policy analysts, others perceived
it in a more favorable light. Michael Mandelbaum, for
example, cited NATO enlargement as a provocation
that Moscow could not tolerate, and it exemplified a
major shortcoming of the West’s approach to Russia
in the post-Soviet period—ignoring Moscow’s
legitimate concerns. He noted with special emphasis
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that the Americans and Europeans forgot a compelling
historical lesson: If defeated countries are not integrated
into the post-war security system, they may eventually
undermine it. For example, after Napoleon’s defeat early in the 19th century, the monarchs of Europe provided
a place for France in the post-war environment. The
United States, by welcoming Germany and Japan into
the West’s security embrace after World War II did
the same thing. But note that by failing to integrate a
defeated Germany into Europe after World War I, that
blunder led to the ascendancy of Adolph Hitler and
the most devastating war in human history.
In preventing a future conflict in Europe,
Mandelbaum has advocated the West give serious
consideration to Medvedev’s proposal and find a place
for Russia in NATO. For many of his colleagues, that
is thinking about the unthinkable, but perhaps that
impulse is based upon conditions associated with the
Cold War that no longer pertain to today’s security
environment.22
The case for maintaining the existing European
security architecture which excludes Russia can be
provided in a few words. Under Putin, Russia is on
a journey into the past—one that is reminiscent of the
Soviet Empire. Putin’s autocratic rule clashes with his
claim of Russia wanting to become a normal European
country with a democratic polity, a vibrant civil society, and a thriving free market. Putin’s exploitation
of Russia’s energy assets as a geo-political weapon
clashes with his assertion that he seeks harmonious
relations with his neighbors. There is no doubt that
some in Russia, who prefers modernization to empire,
eagerly welcome all of these things, but unfortunately
they are not in charge.
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Janusz Bugajski, in his Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism, contends that Putin’s return to an imperialist
path has placed at risk countries that once belonged to
the Soviet Empire. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact have faded into the mist of history, but the imperial
impulse resonates in the hearts and minds of the
Kremlin leadership. Bugajski cites six broad strategic
goals that are in line with the Kremlin’s hegemonic
ambitions in this region: expanding Russia’s foreign
policy reach into the former Soviet space; securing
monopolistic control over the countries occupying that
space; compelling the countries of Eastern Europe to
become politically dependent upon Russia; preventing
the West from gaining influence over that space; using
“Eastern Europe as a springboard for rebuilding a larger sphere of predominant influence and great power
status; and promoting Russia’s global geo-strategic
objectives while eliminating U.S. unipolarity.”23
The Economist’s Edward Lucas agrees that New
Europe represents a central front in the struggle
between the West and Russia, and Putin’s imperial
ambitions explain why the New Europeans are
vulnerable to Moscow’s machinations. Lucas argues
also that there is a value gap between Russia and the
West that represents a huge barrier to cooperation. With
the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister
in 1999, the Kremlin leadership returned to autocratic
rule, what Lucas refers to as “The New Tsarism.”24
Former members of the KGB have achieved near
total political power in the Kremlin, and there is reason
to believe that Putin and his associates provoked the
Second Chechen War to accomplish this objective.
There is one party rule in Russia, and critics who
openly challenge the government are intimidated into
silence, arrested, exiled, and in some cases killed. Putin
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has further consolidated centralized control of Russia’s
pseudo federal system by denying governors in 89
regions the legitimacy of free elections.
While Putin has tolerated independent printed
publications, he has secured near total control of TV—
the most important source of political information
for most Russians. At the same time, he has put the
business oligarchs on notice that if they fail to cooperate
with the Kremlin, they, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
the former owner of Yukos, could find themselves in
prison. He also has made things difficult for NGOs in
Russia citing open or presumably hidden funding to
support his claim that foreign entities are behind socalled Russian efforts to create a civil society.
Lucas’s claims, and those of like-minded colleagues, are not merely the ranting of unrepentant
Cold Warriors, for some Russian commentators have
added their voices in explaining why it is foolhardy
to believe that the Kremlin leadership is truly serious
about security cooperation with the West. Accusations
that the Europeans and Americans have isolated Russia while encircling it with a military curtain ignore
evidence of Russia’s self-isolation. Lilya Shevtsova
writes in reference to the war in Georgia,
The events this August confirm the simple truth that
Russian foreign policy is really an instrument deployed
to accomplish objectives of the domestic political
agenda. Since the powers that be seem patently unable
to consolidate society by any means and excuses save for
existence of an enemy, it means that they will certainly
find a scapegoat even if NATO stops being available in
this capacity for any reason.25

In short, for many observers of Russia, the overriding truth is that it is a revisionist power that does not
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seek accommodation with its neighbors, only domination over them. To expect the Kremlin leadership to
behave otherwise simply is not part of its DNA.
Notwithstanding such legitimate reservations,
some American statesmen have responded favorably to
Medvedev’s proposal even if they may not agree with
him about the contents of a new security system. “We
believe that the fundamental interests of the United
States, Europe, and Russia are more aligned today—
or can be made so—even in the wake of the Georgia
crisis, than at any point in recent history. We must not
waste that opportunity.”26 These are the words of two
prominent American statesmen, Henry Kissinger and
George Shultz. Both were former Secretaries of State
and, along with retired Democratic Senator Sam Nunn
and one-time Clinton Defense Secretary William Perry,
they have staunchly lobbied for ridding the world of
nuclear weapons. This objective cannot be achieved
without Russia’s help and the same holds for crushing
the Taliban in Afghanistan, and denying the Iranians a
nuclear weapons arsenal.
Kissinger and Schultz note that after the August
War there were calls to chastise Moscow but “isolating
Russia is not a sustainable long-term policy. It is neither
feasible nor desirable to isolate a country adjoining
Europe, Asia and the Middle East and possessing a
stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to that of the
United States.”27 All of these observations are in keeping
with the perspective of the Obama administration, and
that explains why there has been a surge in bilateral
discussions between officials in Washington and
Moscow.
Medvedev’s proposal has been favorably received
in Old Europe, especially in Berlin and Paris by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicholas Sarkozy
respectively. Like their Russian counterparts, they
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have had reservations about the wisdom of providing
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. While
claiming they favor membership for both countries,
they led the fight at the spring 2008 NATO summit in
Bucharest, Romania, to deny them Membership Action
Plans. Yes, the door remains open to both countries,
but they would not cross the threshold at this time.28
Of course, while some Europeans were alarmed
by the Five Day War and interpreted the gas dispute
between Moscow and Kiev as cause to urgently seek
alternatives to Russia’s energy exports, others cited
both events as evidence that Europe must more closely
work with Russia on all fronts. At the same time, there
was no prospect that Europe can find a replacement
for Russia’s natural gas any time soon even if efforts
were underway to do so.
Likewise the global economic crisis—for which the
United States has to take major responsibility—has
enhanced the case of those who argue that in today’s
world only multilateral solutions can resolve global
problems. Yes, a value gap separates Russia from
its Western partners, but the economic crisis clearly
demonstrates that common interests are the basis for
the relations between the United States, Europe, and
Russia, not arguments over their domestic affairs. After
all, Washington has ignored human rights violations
and autocracy among its allies, such as Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, for years, so why not give Russia a pass as
well—it is in our vital security interest to do so.
Proponents of a new security system for Europe,
however, cannot ignore one compelling reservation:
Medvedev’s proposal lacks substance. His remarks to
date represent a vague statement of principles absent
concrete proposals about what the security system
would look like.29
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A second compelling problem for those in the West
favoring efforts along these lines is exemplified by the
question: How do we give Russia a voice in a European
security affairs but not a veto? As indicated at the
outset, this volume will attempt to provide an answer
to this question by assessing the points of conflict
between the West and Russia in the context of Europe.
In doing so, all avenues will be explored including the
possibility of providing Russia with a MAP for NATO
membership.
One thing is apparent at this point: Progress on
these matters will all turn on the success or failure
of Washington and Moscow to find a follow-up to
START.
START
The last significant U.S.-Russian arms control
treaty was the 2002 Moscow Treaty or the Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). But “Without
START, . . . SORT will lose the verification and counting
provisions that had made this short and streamlined
treaty somewhat meaningful.”30 Prevailing safeguards
tethered to START then will terminate if that treaty is
allowed to expire in December 2009.
Subsequently, a new nuclear arms race could
ensue, and efforts to address a host of security issues
in Europe would be placed in a deep-freeze. What is
more, this abortive effort to address the scourge of
nuclear weapons would occur at a time when Iran is
striving to build a nuclear weapons arsenal, presumably
with the intention of placing nuclear munitions on
its solid-fueled ICBMs; at a time when North Korea
is both expanding its nuclear arsenal and its capacity
to deliver nuclear-tipped warheads; at a time when
control of Pakistan’s substantial nuclear arsenal
24

remains in question; and at a time when the availability
of unregulated fissile material is making it feasible for
rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons and terrorist
organizations to secure nuclear grade weapons
material. Under these circumstances, the specter of an
American city being devastated by a nuclear bomb or
device would surge.
Before turning to the issues involved in the ongoing
START negotiations, a few words of background are in
order. The elder Bush and Gorbachev signed START
I in 1991 and, under it neither side could have more
than 1,600 delivery systems (ground launched intercontinental missiles and those carried by submarines
and bombers) and no more that 6,000 nuclear warheads.
According to Russian sources, the day it was signed,
the Soviet Union had 10,271 strategic nuclear warheads
carried on 2,500 launchers. The respective figures
for the United States were 10,563 and 2,246.31 Note
that these figures are estimates, and those of us who
operate in an open environment can only rely upon
them for guidance. That said, there does not appear to
be a dispute over their accuracy.
The treaty became operative in 1994. Seven years
later, “Russia said it now had 1,136 vehicles and
5,518 warheads, and the U.S. 1,237 vehicles and 5,948
warheads.”32 START II was signed in 1993, but the
treaty was never ratified.33 Among other things, it
would have prohibited the deployment of Multiple
Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs).
Soon after their introduction, both sides deemed them
to be destabilizing, and therefore it made sense to
remove them from the nuclear equation. There simply
was no way that defensive systems—given daunting
technological problems and enormous costs—could
prevent an offensive strike armed with MIRVs from
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devastating a country under a wholesale nuclear attack.
Under these circumstances, MAD was subverted.
In contrast to his father, however, George W. Bush
displayed wariness toward arms control and cancelled
the 1972 ABM Treaty in December 2001. Russia
retaliated by withdrawing from START II. But Bush
did move the nuclear arms control agenda forward in
2002 with SORT. “Although it has set a ceiling of 1,700
to 2,200 warheads for each side, it has not stipulated
the number of vehicles and warheads per vehicle—
each side is free to decide on the make-up of its nuclear
forces. The treaty did not provide control mechanisms
either—instead, both sides limited themselves to a
reference to START and to calling an implementation
commission meeting twice a year.”34
In short, without START, SORT would expire as
well, and for the first time in 15 years the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia would not be
framed by a single agreement.35 Alexei Arbatov writes:
“This situation is largely the result of the destructive
policy pursed by the USA, especially by the Republican
Administration over the last eight years.”36 While it is
common practice for Russian commentators to blame
the Americans for a host of unfortunate circumstances,
the record appears to support his assessment of events,
for the Bush administration displayed a cavalier
attitude toward arms control during its second term in
office.
Bush and his closest advisers were likewise
dismissive of the strategic nuclear balance that rested
on MAD. He quipped at one point that the United
States would replace “mutual assured destruction with
mutual cooperation.”37 From Moscow’s perspective,
this meant that the United States would go for a
position of nuclear dominance and henceforth dictate
to Moscow the terms of the strategic nuclear balance.
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American defense analysts have conceded that
there is a basis for Russian claims to this effect. One
writing in the last year of the Bush-43 administration
observed, “The dominant motif of U.S. defense policy,
to some extent under President Clinton, but strongly
articulated in the Bush administration, is the refusal to
accept any kind of deterrence upon its capabilities for
a global strike.”38
In the Russian reading of the 2002 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), one finds the basis for the linkage
between Bush’s withdrawing from the ABM Treaty
and the U.S. drive for absolute security. According to
press reports, this classified document stressed three
interrelated parts of the strategic U.S. nuclear arsenal:
• Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (and
the addition of conventional munitions) to deter
or preempt rogue nations and movements that
threatened the United States with WMD. Note:
Special attention was placed on the development
of conventional munitions that could, in effect,
replicate the power of small nuclear munitions,
and this asset is the basis for Moscow’s assertion
that they cannot be ignored in negotiating
START.
• The adoption of a national missile defense
system that would prevent rogue states like
Iran or North Korea from raining rockets on the
United States.
• Lastly, a wholesale upgrading of the U.S.
national security infrastructure.
The Union of Concerned Scientists said that the
NPR undermined efforts to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and concluded, “U.S. nonproliferation
goals can be accomplished only if the United States
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demonstrated by its own actions and policies that it
has reached the firm conclusion that nuclear weapons
bring with them greater dangers than security benefits
and that it intends to move expeditiously toward a
non-nuclear world altogether with the other nuclear
weapons states.”39 An even more explosive claim was
made several years later when two American analysts
concluded that the United States had the capacity to
launch a first strike against Russia without fear of being
devastated by a returning second strike.40
Before becoming president, Bush indicated that he
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty; but 9/11, and
the global war on terrorism, provided an additional
pretext to scrap it and make a fundamental shift in U.S.
defense strategy. Henceforth national missile defense
would be a critical component of U.S. security doctrine,
and this focus would feed fears in Moscow that the
United States was securing a first-strike capability.
The Kremlin noted with emphasis that the American
missile complex in Eastern Europe would represent
the third and final leg of the global U.S. system. The
other two were in Alaska and California.
Bush’s refusal to acknowledge Moscow’s concerns
about NMD underscored its conviction that the
Americans no longer took Russia seriously and would
treat it with contempt. Presumably this explained why
Bush did not take active measures to pursue agreements
on arms control that he made with Putin at Sochi in
April 2008. In the Declaration at the seaside resort,
“They reiterated their intention to carry out further
reduction in strategic offensive arms, they pledged to
continue development of a legally binding post-START
arrangement, and they restated their commitment
to Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) which calls for eventual total elimination of
nuclear weapons.”41
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Meanwhile, Russian arms control experts like
Arbatov wrote in the summer of 2008 that after years
of inaction on these matters, Russia was ill-prepared
to negotiate them with the Americans. There had been
a “departure of qualified civil and military specialists
from the ministries and agencies”42 and an absence of
“a community of diplomats, military professionals,
scientists and defense industry representatives who
share a collective experience of cooperation” in dealing
with strategic arms control issues.43
At her confirmation hearing, Obama’s choice for
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, observed that arms
control experts must be returned to Foggy Bottom
to achieve one of the administration’s priorities—
negotiating a new round of arms control agreements
with Russia.44 They found little work under the
previous administration even though they might have
wanted to do more. It is noteworthy, however, that
the individuals who have played an aggressive role
in pressing for arms control initiatives in the United
States are not identified by party affiliation but more
by age, that is, by individuals who were active in
government during the Cold War—an era that has
been labeled the Golden Age of arms control. For them
the bomb represented a compelling existential threat.
Their younger colleagues, by contrast, have been
preoccupied with the global war on terrorism and
are disinclined to pay much attention to the Russian
Question.
Today, Russian authorities remain wary of Obama
as many believe that he has not shed the hubris of his
counterparts and, in spite of his congenial words, the
Kremlin remains cautious in their dealings with him.
Tough talk on the part of his Secretary of State and
Vice-President regarding Russia has been cited by
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them as a reason why they remained skeptical about
his intentions in the run-up to the Moscow Summit in
July.
Contrary to some dark predictions, the Summit was
a success. After years of drift and a gathering storm
of enmity, the world’s two superpowers were once
again talking seriously about their strategic nuclear
relationship. In light of the inactivity of the recent past
and uncertainty about the future, there is a risk that
their significance may be exaggerated, but in addition
to favorable words about START negotiations, several
other hard-security agreements were adopted: an
accord on American-Russian military cooperation;
allowing the U.S.-NATO forces to cross Russian
territory to resupply their troops in Afghanistan with
lethal weapons; a commitment to conduct a jointassessment of defensive and offensive systems; and
the creation of a missile-launch detection center.
Two notable interrelated points of conflict, however,
were not resolved. Russia did not commit itself to
working with the United States to impose heavy new
penalties upon Iran. Indeed, in the various meetings
and press conferences that were conducted, Iran did
not receive a great deal of attention. Also, Obama did
not announce that the American anti-missile project
in Eastern Europe had been cancelled. He did placate
his Russian host’s concern about NMD by asserting
that the issue of the anti-missile project in the Czech
Republic and Poland was under internal review, and
he agreed to discuss the relationship between defensive
and offensive systems. Realizing that Obama faced
stiff political pressure at home if it appeared that he
had crumbled on this issue in the face of pressure from
Moscow, the Russian leadership wisely did not make
much of this matter.
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In his Moscow press conferences and public
addresses, President Obama made a concerted effort
to address Russian claims that Washington has been
going out of its way to humiliate Russia and to diminish
its importance in world affairs. He did not receive
the exuberant rock-star reception that he enjoyed
elsewhere, but Russia’s leaders and people appreciated
his gestures of good will. His trip demonstrated that
Washington was conceding before the world that
Russia mattered! Several weeks after the Summit,
Interfax published a poll indicating that 54 percent of
the Russian people thought that Obama’s visit meant
better Russian-American relations.45
While the START deliberations have been conducted behind closed doors, the major points of contention
are not secret. They include the following:
• “Moscow does not want to accept anything less
than legally binding agreements in the area of
military-political relations.”46 Bush balked at
the idea because among other things that would
allow the Senate to have a voice in the matter
that he deemed a preserve of the president, but
it appears that the Obama administration will
accept a law-based document.
• A thornier issue is Moscow’s desire to tie the
new treaty to a parallel agreement on ballistic
missile defenses and weapons in space.47
American arms controllers are convinced that
efforts to renegotiate START will be placed at
risk by including outside elements in the talks.
Still, some commentators in Moscow indicated
that if the United States deployed the missile
defense system in Eastern Europe, START was
dead.48
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• SORT calls for the reduction but not the
destruction of warheads. The Russians want
them destroyed and not merely placed in storage
as the Americans prefer. What the Russians
call up-load potential, then, is a major concern
to them; i.e., taking them out of storage and
placing them on launchers. Conversely, defense
analysts in Washington see them as insurance
against a third party threatening the United
States.
• Moscow has expressed deep concern about
American conventional weapons capable of
hitting a target with pin-point accuracy and
deadly force. Russia does not have a similar
capability and wants the weapons in question
to be counted along with nuclear warheads.
For the United States, they offer a non-nuclear
option since they can destroy deeply embedded
terrorist bases. In this instance, think Iran.
• Perhaps the most serious point of discord
involves the dispute over a reduction in delivery
vehicles. At the Moscow Summit, Russian
officials demanded deep cuts in American
bombers and ground and sea-based rockets and
mentioned a total of 600. As of January 2009,
Russia possessed 800 delivery systems and
the United States possessed 1,200 launchers.
The American negotiators favored the higher
number.49
• Russian analysts remain concerned about
the question of how many and what kind
of warheads are placed upon the launchers
and how the requirement of transparency is
determined.
• Finally, officials in Moscow have stated categorically that they cannot accept an American
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proposal that strategic nuclear weapons for both
sides be reduced to 1,000. This number would
subject Russia’s declining nuclear forces to an
American first-strike.50
Opposition to START has been muted in American
defense circles, but some critics fear that the new
accord will undermine the U.S. nuclear strike force. For
example, Peter Hussey, a consultant to the National
Defense University (NDU), rejects the idea that we
can end our nuclear triad and rest easy if there is a
dramatic reduction in strategic U.S. nuclear warheads.
“The synergy between intercontinental ballistic and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles is what gives
deterrence its strength and viability. . . .” Should the
United States eliminate either of the ICBM systems,
both North Korea and Iran “will thank the United
States for its thoughtlessness and continue their nuclear programs.”51 There is no evidence that China or
Russia would stand-down a single one of its nucleararmed rockets should the United States follow this
path.
The START follow-up negotiations have energized
those who oppose the very idea of the United States
resetting political-military relations with Russia, but
it appears that they do not have the heft to abort it.52
In light of the slow pace at which the Senate operates,
however, and the efforts on the part of some lawmakers
to exploit the ratification process for their own parochial political gains, the deadline of December 5 may
not be met. Senator Richard Lugar has warned Obama
that if he does not submit a treaty to the Senate by
September 2009, it probably will not be ratified by the
deadline.53 Also if on the eve of the START deadline the
economy remains mired in low productivity, high rates
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of unemployment, a phlegmatic stock market, widespread unhappiness with his health plan, and a soaring
deficit with few signs of improvement, Obama’s
popularity may nose-dive.
It would appear that the White House can depend
upon its 60-vote margin in the Senate—with support
from some Republicans—to get a treaty through that
body. The U.S. Senate approved the Moscow Treaty,
SORT, by a margin of 95 to 0, and even if the START
follow-up treaty will not pass by such a wide margin,
it is likely to be ratified. Note, only 25 percent of the
American people have indicated that they oppose arms
control negotiations with Russia.54 Also while some of
Obama’s political opponents are prepared to adopt a
slash and burn effort to curtail his domestic policies,
many of them will be reluctant to do so when a matter
of national security is concerned.
On the Russian side, one can assume that the PutinMedvedev duo will provide the political clout necessary
to bring about a replacement treaty. Still, failure to
reconcile differences over missile defenses and space
weapons or the status of powerful precision-guided
conventional weapons could become a vexing point of
discord between Washington and Moscow. Also some
incident in Europe’s troubled neighborhood could bring
front and center the reality that the Americans enjoy
an unrivalled advantage in conventional forces, and
it would be foolhardy for Russia to reduce its nuclear
assets. There is no question that given the massive U.S.
advantage in conventional forces, it benefits every time
the number of nuclear weapons are scrapped. Members
of the Russian military have been making this case for
some time even though the counterclaim can be made
that Russia will be hurt more by a START failure than
Washington. It simply does not have the resources to
match the United States in a nuclear arms race.55
34

Critics on both sides who warn of military risks,
however, have a weak case. Even at the level of
1,000—about 700 nuclear weapons less than the figure
that is being used in the START negotiations—both
sides will possess more than enough fire-power to
sustain the American-Russian nuclear balance and the
capacity to devastate any country that is insane enough
to direct a nuclear strike against them. At Moscow, the
number mentioned was only a little less than 1,700,
and while the talks have been conducted under close
wraps, it appears that both sides are comfortable with
it. Of course, the negotiators may threaten to walk away
from the talks to enhance their bargaining position, but
in the final analysis neither side can allow the START
negotiations to fail. That outcome would set in motion
a fire-storm of rancorous claims and counter-claims
that would make any attempt to cooperate on security
matters nearly impossible. Still that does not mean that,
given the vagaries of the human condition, a successful
outcome to the START negotiations is a certainty.
One thing is certain, with a successful outcome
to START, efforts to achieve progress on reconciling
differences over other contentious issues in Europe
will be given a strong boost.
NATO ENLARGEMENT
With the end of the Cold War, NATO pursued two
conflicting goals: to consolidate the zone of democracy
that had appeared in Eastern Europe, and to develop
a new security relationship with Russia. The Kremlin
saw them as mutually exclusive, since the first
entailed NATO enlargement without Russia, while
its accomplishment negated the second goal, Russian
integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Also, as
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Dmitry Trenin has indicated, there never was a serious
effort on the West’s part to provide Russia with a voice
in a post-Cold War security regime.56
In 1997, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint
Council (PJC) was created in an effort to placate Boris
Yeltsin’s concern about further eastward enlargement
without a Russian input. But Moscow deemed it
inadequate, a ploy to deny Russia a real voice in security
decisionmaking. Yeltsin took an on-again-off-again
approach to the prospect of membership in NATO, but
some European commentators proposed that Russia
deserved a greater role in European security affairs.
Timothy Garton Ash, the English journalist/
scholar, wrote in The New York Times in the summer
of 200l: “President George W. Bush has been bold in
his design for a Europe whole and free. Now he needs
to be bolder still.”57 Ash, who had been a champion of
Solidarity and supported Baltic membership in NATO,
urged the U.S. president to go further. “When Mr. Bush
meets Vladimir Putin today, he should express clearly
that his vision includes a future in which a democratic
Russia is eventually embraced as part of NATO.”58
Several weeks after 9/11, Tony Blair proposed that
the PJC be replaced by a new security entity, The RussiaNorth Atlantic Council (NRC). A week later, during
a 2-day visit to Moscow, NATO’s General Secretary,
George Robertson, discussed the new appendage
with Putin, remarking that it had the support of the
American, British, Canadian, and Italian leadership.59
In their discussions, Putin and Robertson focused on
cooperation in three areas: terrorism, arms control—
including nuclear proliferation—and peacekeeping.
Robertson responded to expressions of alarm among
European and American analysts that Russia would
enjoy a veto over NATO decisions by proclaiming that
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no such deal was in the works. NATO would enlarge
eastward in spite of Putin’s reservations. At the same
time, Igor Ivanov, Russia’s foreign minister, remarked:
“What is at issue is not full fledged participation or
membership in NATO but going in a new direction, a
new quality which is in line with the times.”60
Since its inception, the NRC has received mixed
reviews from the Kremlin. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s
Ambassador to NATO, has said, “The strategic task of
the NRC is to serve as the major structure for developing
cooperation between Russia and NATO. But the NRC
failed last year [2008] to fulfill all these tasks.”61 Yet
Rogozin stated that “Russia’s foremost foreign policy
goal” is “a strategic partnership with the West.”
Indeed, he has predicted that the August War will be
perceived by historians as a positive turning point in
relations between Russia and the West. To those who
assert that Russia’s actions in Georgia demonstrate
its aggressiveness, the tart-tongued Ambassador
responded that all his country wanted was “the return
of Russia to its rightful position on the world stage.”62
He also advised the Europeans that, “It is time for
Europe to stop acting like an occupied continent and
start displaying its own political will.”63 It is words
of this nature that have convinced many Western
observers that Medvedev’s proposal is merely a
device to drive a wedge between America and Europe.
Russian commentators deny that it is a devious effort
to split the West; rather Medvedev’s critique of NATO
wrests on the following propositions:
• NATO has been a destabilizing force in Europe
creating a new line of enmity between its
members and Russia.
• Its eastern enlargement has encircled Russia
with a curtain of steel and its New European
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members are represented by countries where
large numbers of people harbor aggressive
intentions towards it.
• NATO is a relic of the Cold War and a hollow
shell. It is all form without substance, as the
mounting predictions of disaster in Afghanistan
suggests.
• Since Russia has been excluded from NATO, it
must be replaced by a more inclusive common
security regime, and in the meantime any effort
to include Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance
must be halted.
How well do these claims stand up under scrutiny?
First, in spite of Kremlin disclaimers, expanding
the zone of democracy in Eastern Europe through
NATO has been a plus for everyone living in the
region. For the first time in centuries, a war between
its major powers, such as France versus Germany, is
unthinkable. Likewise, divisions within and between
nations have been resolved; specifically, ethnic and
territorial claims have been superceded by the security
that is associated with NATO membership. Poles
are not asking for a change in their boundaries with
Germany nor is the reverse true, while Hungary and
Romania are not clashing over the heavily Hungarian
area of Transylvania that is under Bucharest’s rule.
Second, there has not been a significant deployment
of NATO troops to the new member states of Eastern
Europe and the curtain of steel metaphor is baseless.
After enduring centuries of Czarist rule and brutal
Soviet oppression in the 20th century, the New
Europeans joined NATO in search of a safe harbor.
Against this legacy, is it any wonder that they feared
the intentions of their giant neighbor to the East? Since
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they had no idea what the future would bring Russia,
it would have defied human nature for them not to
anticipate worse case scenarios—a resurgent bellicose
Russia or one that disintegrated into a failed state.
Room must be made for any European state that
wishes to enter NATO and meets its requirements—
assuming, of course, that the alliance members are
capable and willing to defend it if attacked. The Russians no more have the right to demand special
privileges at the expense of their Baltic neighbors than
the French do to maintain special privileges in their
former North African or Sub-Saharan colonies. Colonial
peoples have the right to choose their destiny wherever
they may reside, and it is unconscionable to deny them
what is a fundamental principle of international law.
One would think that the French and Germans who
have complained about Washington’s dismissing their
concerns, would not do the same thing in addressing
the New European’s fears about a revanchist Russia.
Likewise, Russia faces serious internal security
problems and threats to its south and east in an arc
of instability, while its western frontiers are occupied
by small democratic countries that neither have the
means nor the will to threaten it. It is simply untrue
that Russia is less secure today because of NATO
enlargement. Would Putin and Medvedev rather have
several unstable countries—similar to those in the
North Caucasus—embroiled in violence on Russia’s
borders? The egos of the imperial-minded may be
bruised by eastward enlargement, but progressives
who hope that Russia may eventually become a
modern democratic (normal European) society cite the
democracies on their western frontier as evidence that
the quest for pluralism is not beyond their grasp.

39

While the Russian critique of NATO fails on the
first two claims, there is reason to find merit in the
second set of charges regarding its viability and the
price of excluding Russia from important decisions
that are made within NATO. Russian commentators
cite the failure of NATO to prevent the Five Day War as
evidence that it is dysfunctional. But an even stronger
case to this effect can be made in looking at its out-ofarea operations in Afghanistan. The war there is beyond
the purview of this monograph, but the prospects that
Washington and its allies in Europe will ultimately
have a falling out over the mission there suggests one of
NATO’s most serious problems: conflicting American
and European assessments of Afghanistan. After the
9/11 terrorist attack, the Europeans rallied around the
United States, and Article 5 of the NATO Charter was
invoked to prevent further attacks. This was the first
time the mutual defense guarantee had ever been put
in place, and defenders of the alliance could cite it as
evidence that NATO had a vital role to play in the postCold War world.
Alliance solidarity took a hit, however, when,
in contrast to the UK, the two other major European
military powers, France and Germany, denied Bush
the UN’s legal backing to invade Iraq. After their
warnings that the invasion was a reckless undertaking
proved to be prescient, European public opinion
reflected growing doubts about American leadership.
The long-held view that “the Americans may abuse
their awesome power on occasion, but in the end
they always do the right thing,” was undermined by
reports that surfaced early in 2004 that U.S. personnel
in Iraq were committing acts of torture in violation of
the Geneva Accords.64
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From the perspective of European public opinion
and many leaders on the Continent, American
triumphalism was the basis for George W. Bush’s
foreign policy blunders in the Greater Middle East.
They, in turn, reaffirmed concerns in Europe about
Washington’s penchant for NATO out of area
operations. Reports that the war in Afghanistan is
not going well has enhanced the influence of those in
Europe who think in these terms. Such sentiments have
been bolstered by mounting NATO casualties and the
recent fraudulent presidential election.
Obama’s speeches during his April visit to Europe
were greeted with unrestrained enthusiasm, but when
urging the deployment of more European troops to
fight the terrorists in Afghanistan, he received a cool
reception. His audiences were exceedingly uneasy
when he said that he would deploy roughly an additional 21,000 American combat troops to Afghanistan.
They interpreted this escalation as an indication that
the new White House residents, like their predecessors, remained enamored with armed conflict as a
major response to international problems.
When Obama was elected president, there were
almost an equal number of American and NATOmember troops fighting in Afghanistan—about 30,000
troops each. After entering the White House, Obama
took measures to enlarge the U.S. combat force so
that by the end of the year, it would be doubled. In
several speeches in Europe during his April visit
he explained why this was necessary, but he was
summarily snubbed by the allies. They offered 5,000
troops, not all of them assigned to combat operations,
while two-thirds would return home after the elections
in Afghanistan were conducted. This raised eye-brows
among foreign policy experts, but most ordinary
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Americans, preoccupied with their own economic
security, seemingly ignored the slight. This has
changed as Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ prediction
has come true—namely, as combat operations surge in
Afghanistan and allied casualties increase, support for
the war will decline.65 Many American have expressed
their anger that, while the Europeans roasted the Bush
administration for fighting the wrong war in Iraq
before the right one was completed in Afghanistan,
many European countries have refused to contribute
their fair share to the fight against jihadist terrorism.
Whatever happened to NATO’s invoking Article 5 for
the first time in its history? Has it been proscribed?
At the same time, those in Europe, who claim that
Afghanistan is America’s problem, have cited mounting
casualties as proof positive that out-of-area operations
go beyond NATO’s mandate. ( Note: Proportionately
more Brits and Canadians have died in Afghanistan
than Americans.) What has been deemed a bogus
presidential election in Afghanistan has hardly helped
Obama’s case for greater European troop deployments
in that country. Bogged-down in Afghanistan, NATO’s
capacity to meet its primary goal to safeguard European
security will decline and lend credence to Medvedev’s
claim that NATO has become an outmoded remnant of
a by-gone era.
But what about the Kremlin’s two-fold warning that:
(a) it has been a grave blunder for the West to exclude
Russia from the alliance’s decisionmaking, and (b) by
providing membership for Georgia and Ukraine, any
hope of Russia joining Europe and the United States in
security cooperation will be foreclosed?
The first part of this warning from Moscow has
already been addressed. In short, the West’s refusal to
give Russia a voice in vital European security affairs
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was a grave error as exemplified by mounting tensions
between the West and Russia that resulted in the Five
Day War. A companion to this view is the European
complaint that in discussions of hard security matters
with Moscow, Washington should not monopolize
the conversation. In spite of the Georgian War, many
Europeans do not believe that Russia represents an
existential threat to them, and they are looking for
ways to arrange bilateral deals with it. Dominique
David, the executive director of the French Institute
of International Relations, has observed: “Only the
Europeans can establish and organize the necessary
dialogue with Russia. To this end they must agree to
speak with a single voice. And it must be their own.”66
The Obama administration then has real cause to
worry that the allies will proclaim support for NATO
rhetorically but in fact will seek bilateral agreements
with Moscow on a host of different issues, including
security ones. Some in Washington claim that it is
precisely this mindset that leads may Americans to
fear—like the New Europeans—that Medvedev’s Plan
is a Trojan horse embedded in the Western Alliance.
But what about claims that NATO membership for
Georgia and Ukraine represent a threat to Russia? The
Western response is that they do not have a factual
basis. Much like the Balts and Poles, the Georgians and
Ukrainians have cause to fear Moscow’s designs on
their sovereignty. Russia’s pressure has exacerbated
political discord within both countries, and it, in
turn, has been cited as cause for denying Georgia and
Ukraine membership in NATO. Many in Kiev and
Tbilisi argue that the domestic turmoil that they have
experienced has been promulgated by members of the
Russian security services. What is more, had Ukraine
and Georgia been embedded in NATO, what has been

43

characterized by critics as the reckless behavior of
their leadership might never have materialized. Had
Georgia and Ukraine been provided membership, they
would have put their own internal political house in
order. In short, the MAP process is a cleansing one.
There may be some justification for these remarks,
but many American and European commentators cite
serious problems in both Ukraine and Georgia that
represent a barrier to their membership. Doubts about
the courts and legal system and widespread corruption
and the capacity of organized crime to infiltrate both
governments prevail in the West. They must be dealt
with before membership is offered. Moreover, existing
fractious behavior between Moscow on the one hand
and Tbilisi and Kiev on the other are capable of
undermining cooperation between NATO and Russia.
In May 2009, while Moscow and Washington were
exchanging unpleasant charges over the wisdom of
NATO conducting military exercises in Georgia, the
government in Tbilisi reported that it aborted a military
coup and plot to kill President Mikhail Saakashvilli.
The inference was that Russia was behind both efforts;
but Moscow depicted the charge as mad and said
that Saakashvilli was trying to deflect attention from
growing opposition to his rule at home. It would
appear that many Western sources were of the same
opinion. This is the conclusion of a Stratfor.com report
that depicted the mutiny at the Mukhrovani Base as a
power play on the president’s part—a ploy, in short, to
achieve two objectives: to cut-short opposition street
demonstrations that called for Saakashvilli’s ouster;
and to settle scores with military leaders who, among
other things, opposed his invasion of South Ossetia.67
Growing reservations about Saakashvilli’s rule
have diminished his image in Washington and in
Europe—including in some New European countries
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that have rallied to Tbilisi’s defense.68 It would
appear, therefore, that Georgia will not be offered the
opportunity to join NATO any time soon to no small
degree because Saakashvilli is considered to be a loose
cannon by American, French, and German leaders. It
is in this sense that the crisis associated with Georgian
NATO membership has been managed. For how long
that will be the case is another matter.
Meanwhile, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian energy
dispute has strained relations between Kiev and
Moscow. Escalating friction between Moscow and
Kiev is potentially of huge significance, and one day
could result in a military clash between Russian and
Ukrainian units. Many among the Kremlin elite claim
that the Ukraine, or at least portions of it—the heavily
populated eastern portion of the country and the
Crimea—belong to Russia; the flaky Nikita Khrushchev
had no right to give it to Ukraine as a gift in the 1950s.
Putin informed George W. Bush: “Ukraine is not a real
country.”69 By this, he meant that Ukraine has been an
integral part of Russia for a thousand years and even
if one ignores this long linkage between Russia and
Ukraine, many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine.
Political turmoil within Ukraine complicates matters further as the pro-Western officials in Kiev are at
odds over the future course of their country in general
and its relations with Moscow in particular. Divisions
among democratic elements in Ukraine suggest that
their dispute could weaken them and strengthen
those in Kiev who prefer a pro-Russian orientation.
Two of the major players in the Orange Revolution,
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia
Timoshenko, have been feuding over ways to engage
Russia, and the political upheaval associated with
their rivalry diminishes a NATO invitation in the near
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term. Also, many Ukrainians have reservations about
a NATO connection, while others clearly prefer close
relations with Moscow. It is noteworthy that many
Ukrainians hold positive views of Russia.70
Still, Ukrainian and Russian authorities face some
daunting areas of discord in the military realm. A
worrisome issue involves the future of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet that is located in the Crimea—where
most residents are Russian. It will come to a head in
several years when the treaty covering Russian naval
bases there expires. Also, Moscow has lashed out at the
authorities in Kiev for providing Saakashvilli’s forces
with weapons, while the Ukrainians in turn assert
that Russia violated international law by allowing its
Black Sea fleet to engage in military operations against
Georgia.
Of larger geo-political significance, prominent
Russian leaders like Moscow’s Mayor Yuri Luzhkov
claim that the Crimea belongs to Russia, and likeminded commentators in Russia not only say the same
thing, they favor providing Ukrainians with Russian
passports in anticipation of the region reverting to
Russian sovereignty. Ukrainian officials in turn charge
that Moscow is waging an ideological crusade against
their country.71
Even if Moscow and Kiev reconcile their differences
in the short term, over the long haul they are likely to
remain in confrontation over the price of gas sales to
Ukraine and Kiev’s disrupting it through the control
of pipelines that transport gas to Europe. Of course,
these commercial disagreements represent a fig leaf
for the real source of enmity—NATO membership.
All of these factors portend potential serious political
upheaval and possibly violent confrontations in a
country whose size and population approximates that
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of France. Tensions between Kiev and Moscow clearly
place at risk efforts on the part of the West and Russia
to cooperate on sensitive military-political issues.
At the December 2008 summit, the NATO foreign
ministers once again denied Georgia a Membership
Action Plan and instead created a Georgia Commission
to help that country prepare for ultimate membership.
They did the same with Ukraine. Whatever the
cover story, these actions sent a clear message to the
governments in Tbilisi and Kiev—you will not be
offered membership for some time.
The Obama administration continues to offer Georgia aid, including some military assistance, and VicePresident Biden, in his trip to Georgia and Ukraine,
pledged U.S. support for their drive for full democracy,
but simultaneously lectured them on doing more along
those lines. Also it is noteworthy that American analysts
who clashed with their European counterparts over the
wisdom of invading Iraq agree with them that neither
Georgia nor Ukraine is ready to enter NATO at this
time. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution
is a Liberal Hawk who favored the invasion of Iraq,
but he has observed: “. . . the net effect of premature
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is to
make war more likely.” Therefore he urges the Obama
administration not to provoke Moscow by pressing for
their immediate membership. This provocation will
preclude the West and Russia from addressing critical
security problems.72 O’Hanlon’s comments find an
appreciative audience in Europe where the leaders in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece will veto any
move to include Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance.
That said, some Western analysts believe that
by denying both countries a MAP, Russia is being
rewarded for invading Georgia, and the West’s weak
response to Moscow’s military actions in that country
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will encourage hardliners in the Kremlin to take even
tougher measures in the future. It was no accident that
the Russian military conducted exercises on its border
with Georgia at the very same time that President
Obama met with Medvedev in Moscow to discuss
American-Russian relations.73
While the Kremlin and its opponents in Europe
continue to level charges at one another that have a
bearing on Medvedev’s proposal, one thing is certain:
There is no prospect that the alliance members are
contemplating NATO’s replacement. There has been
a surge in anxious discussions of NATO, but the
discourse largely focuses upon two things. First is the
reforms required to make NATO relevant to the post9/11 world. Here there is cautious optimism about
achieving this objective, e.g., with France’s rejoining
NATO’s command structure, its president’s favoring a
more robust military alliance, and adjustments in force
structures to address terrorism and to fight cyberspace
wars.
A second major focus is upon providing the EU with
a more robust military capability and finding ways to
promote greater cooperation between it and NATO. It
is with both objectives in mind that the Trans-Atlantic
alliance can be made relevant to the West’s current
military challenges.74
In truth, neither development should be overestimated, and Russian commentators seem to acknowledge that it is imprudent to propose that NATO
be scrapped for an unknown entity. To do so would
set-off alarm bells in Western capitals. For the time
being, the Kremlin can take comfort in the fact that
Medvedev’s idea about new security cooperation has
been favorably received in many of them. Acceptance
of his argument in many Western circles that Russia
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should have a greater voice in European security affairs
is a sufficient victory for him at this point in time.
Furthermore, in addition to Western scholars like
Mandelbaum, statesmen like Joschka Fisher have
taken this proposal to its logical conclusion: Russian
membership in NATO.75 Since many in Washington
deem the former German foreign minister something
of a maverick, his view on this matter has not been
seconded by most of his American counterparts. Still,
the idea is not a new one, for James Baker, the elder
Bush’s secretary of state, wrote after 9/11,
The affirmative case for Russian eligibility for NATO
membership is fairly straightforward and easy to
make. The alliance has at least two implicit and at least
five explicit criteria for admission. The first implicit
requirement is that candidates are a member of the
Atlantic community—this is to say, the West. The second
is that the candidate share important security concerns
with the other members. Russia surely qualifies on both
counts.76

He added, however, that its membership was
unthinkable since Russia did not share common
values with NATO’s members.77 This, it would appear,
represents conventional wisdom on the part of most
members of the American foreign policy community
today. As this monograph has and will demonstrate,
however, NATO membership for Russia appears to be
a vehicle that is gaining traction.
THE U.S. MISSILE SITE IN EASTERN EUROPE
Ever since President Ronald Reagan celebrated the
merits of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the
1980s, Moscow has associated ballistic-missile defense
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systems with a premeditated campaign to undermine
the MAD doctrine. A quick look-back provides
important insights into why the Russians have made
so much of the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe.
Soon after the Soviets placed multiple warheads on
their massive SS-9s, it was apparent that no anti-missile
system could protect soft targets like cities. Offensive
nuclear weapons could always overwhelm defensives
and impose unacceptable damage on the country
under attack. It was easier to deploy a fleet of MIRVed
ICBMs than to blunt them through a missile defense
system. To avoid an even more dangerous arms race,
the nuclear superpowers signed the May 1972 SALT I
Treaty. The ABM Treaty was incorporated within it,
and at the outset provided for two sites and then only
one after a 1974 revision.78
After Soviet nuclear strategists accepted the
argument that a viable ABM system would place
MAD at risk, they greeted with alarm Reagan’s 1983
announcement that the United States would explore
the feasibility of an ABM defense. A year later, the
SDI was adopted which stunned the Russians because
the only logic that they saw behind it was the drive
to achieve a U.S. first strike capability. What is more,
Reagan’s threat to roll back the Iron Curtain was a
dangerous marriage of capability and intent that they
could not ignore. SDI faded as costs and technological
problems soared, and, with the USSR’s collapse, fears
attending a massive Soviet attack subsided. Funding
for the program remained in the budget, but the focus
henceforth was about Theater Missile Defense.
Upon gaining control of the Congress in 1994, the
Republicans pressed forward, but, fearing a violation of
the ABM agreement, Clinton did not move energetically
to deploy a missile shield. During the 2000 presidential
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campaign, George W. Bush said he favored it, and
the Russians took note that one of its most active and
articulate advocates, Donald Rumsfeld, was appointed
Bush’s Secretary of Defense. After 9/11, the urgency
to protect the country grew, and Vice-President Dick
Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice warned that the next terrorist attack might be
exemplified by a mushroom cloud. On December
13, 2001, the President announced the United States
would withdraw from the treaty, and the Missile
Defense Agency was established. The new layered
system would intercept missiles in all phases—lift-off,
mid-course, and terminal. Its purpose was to protect
America and its allies against a limited nuclear attack
by a rogue regime—presumably, North Korea or in the
near future, Iran.
President Bush proclaimed that he welcomed
Russia’s support for the program and indicated that
the United States would keep Moscow advised of
its progress. In signing SORT, both sides promised
to engage in transparency and information sharing
that had a bearing on the American NMD. Similar
promises were made in signing other agreements and
efforts—such as the NRC—to promote confidence in
this endeavor.
The Russian side interpreted that pledge against the
2002 NPR. “The fact that the NPR was only partially
declassified must have unshackled the imagination of
GRU analysts. . . .The emphasis on precision strikes
combined with enhanced intelligence against mobile
targets must have left the Russians wondering about
the survivability of Russia’s mobile SS-25 and SS-27
(Topol-M) ICBMs,” and this would force “them to
think about the survivability of their country's silobased ICBMs and command and control facilities.”79
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Prior to Bush’s election, several individuals who
would secure high level posts in his administration—
Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz—would press
for a full blown missile defense system via the neoconservative Project for the New American Century.
At the same time, leading members of the Department
of Defense (DoD) derided arms control per se; for
example, Douglas Feith, the third in command at
Bush’s Pentagon, informed Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the
First Deputy of the Russian General Staff that “We’re
not looking to create arms control-style negotiations or
agreements.”80
Russian analysts knew that Feith’s boss, Wolfowitz,
was the master-mind behind a document that surfaced
in the administration of the older Bush. With the
demise of the Soviet Empire, James Mann wrote: “The
search for a new post-cold war rationale for American
military power culminated a few months later in
one of the most significant foreign policy documents
of the past half century. It set forth a new vision for
a world dominated by a lone American superpower,
actively working to make sure that no rival or group of
rivals would ever emerge.” The document written by
Wolfowitz’s assistant, Zalmay Khalilzad, leaked out of
the Pentagon in draft form. After it had become public,
the embarrassed administration ordered it rewritten.
Mann observed its essence would be adopted by Bush43.81 It is against this backdrop that Russian concern
about the United States building an NMD to achieve
nuclear dominance must be assessed.
U.S. analysts are too modest in dismissing
Russian concerns about an American technological
breakthrough in a NMD campaign. Russian analysts,
by contrast, cannot afford to assess U.S. capabilities in
what they may see as a cavalier dismissal of American
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know-how. In addition to the vast resources available
to the U.S. side, it also has the capacity to secure the
help of gifted and well-financed European and Japanese
colleagues. In a word, Russian defense analysts would
be derelict in ignoring the full U.S. potential in any area
regarding nuclear weapons.
Fyodor Lukyanov has observed that U.S. “. . .
missile-defense elements planned for Poland and the
Czech Republic are the third phase” of a global system.
“There are serious doubts that this is technologically
possible, but this could change in the future. And
if it does, the strategic balance in the world would
shift dramatically because it would remove the basic
principle that has ensured stability in the past—the
threat of mutually assured destruction.”82
Also, two American observers, George N. Lewis
and Theodore A. Postol, claimed that the Eastern European shield would effectively blunt an ICBM attack
against the United States. Consequently, “It is difficult
to see why a well-informed Russian analyst would not
find such a potential situation alarming.”83 This was a
minority view among American officials who argued
that they have shared evidence with their Russian
counterparts that indicated that the Eastern European
project did not threaten Russia. Consequently, why
were their colleagues in Moscow so troubled?
Pavel Felgengauer, an independent Russian defense analyst who is a bitter critic of the Kremlin, explains
why they feel this way. Russian military observers
are puzzled by the logic behind the American system
since it rests on the notion of a direct intercept of an
oncoming missile. That is, “A solid metal warhead is
directed to strike and pulverize an attacking ballistic
target on collision course.” But,
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The Russian military believes that the “direct intercept”
concept that they abandoned during the Cold War is
still technically impossible. The military tells its political
masters that the American direct intercept concept or
“bullet hitting bullet” is a hoax and cannot work in the
real world. It is assumed that the missiles in Poland will,
in fact, be nuclear-tipped and intended for a surprise
attack to annihilate the Russian political and military
leadership in their workplaces in Moscow, effectively
incapacitating Russia before a mass of other U.S. nuclear
missiles from more distant locations comes crashing in
to destroy a helpless Russia.84

The Kremlin concluded long before the 2008
presidential election that to talk with the Bush
administration about arms control matters was a
hopeless enterprise. If President Bush was serious
about arms control, why would he scrap one of the
most significant arms control agreements, the ABM
Treaty? Just weeks before President Bush retired to
Texas, John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, sought to
assuage Moscow’s fears about the missile system by
offering Russian officers access to it on a constant basis
and by adopting a policy of transparency on all matters
germane to its operation. His Russian counterparts did
not budge and continued to oppose the deployment,
not primarily because they feared the United States was
prepared to launch a first strike against them, rather
because it would provide the Americans with modern
military assets that could in the short term force the
Kremlin to accept humiliating geo-political concessions
and in the long term enhance—with a technological
break-through— an American first-strike.85
There was cause to believe, however, that the missile shield in Eastern Europe would never be deployed.
When running for the presidency, Obama registered
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reservations about its capabilities, while observing
that the threat of an Iranian missile strike was not
existential. What is more, critics of its deployment
made the following arguments against it:
• The system is massively expensive and in light
of America’s daunting economic crisis, its cost
takes on new significance. Since President
Reagan delivered his Star Wars speech, it has
been estimated that $120 billion has been spent
on missile defense, and since 2002 the bill has
amounted to $56 billion, with an additional
$50 billion in the works.86 Under existing
circumstances, it may be difficult for Congress to
provide these funds. It has proven unworkable,
and there is as yet no evidence that it will provide
the protection for which it was designed.87
• No rogue state will launch a missile against the
United States—that borders on national suicide.
At the same time, terrorists do not possess
ICBMs, and the means of delivery they could
deploy—a nuclear device of some kind in a
suitcase—cannot be stopped by any anti-missile
system.
• Insofar as Iran’s ability to strike the United
States or one of its allies is concerned, analysts
like MIT’s Theodore Postol estimate that in spite
of its having a solid-fueled-two-staged Sejjil
rocket, it will be many years before it can place
a nuclear warhead on it that can be used against
Europe or the United States.
• Finally, as indicated above, Postol and an
associate claim that the U.S. system in Eastern
Europe could be effective against a Russian
ICBM strike against the United States.88
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Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, after
meeting with his Russian counterpart in November
2008, said, “Deployment of a missile defense system
would bring nothing to security in Europe . . . it
would complicate things, and would make them move
backward.”89 Many Europeans endorsed his analysis,
not to mention that public opinion in Poland and the
Czech Republic opposed the system. Even while the
Bush administration was pushing for its deployment,
there were doubts about it being endorsed by their
respective legislatures. Recall also that the leaders in
Eastern Europe favored the system because in their
eyes it bolstered the U.S. pledge to defend them, so if
other means were taken to accomplish that objective,
their ardor for the system would cool.
The Kremlin anticipated an Obama victory hoping
that it might strike a deal with him on NMD, but
the day after he was elected president, Medvedev
committed a serious faux pas when he threatened
to deploy missiles in Russia’s western most Oblast,
Kaliningrad, to counter the planned American antimissile complex in the Czech Republic and Poland.90
By threatening Obama, Medvedev was subverting the
hope of the international community that, with a new
American president, the United States might once again
act like a responsible superpower. His advisors should
have reminded him that most inhabitants of the world,
unlike most Americans and Russians, were people of
color who have chafed under European colonial rule
for centuries. Therefore, they were enthralled that the
world’s most powerful country elected a black man
president, and they saw Obama’s success as a victory
for themselves as well.
Medvedev quickly retreated when he realized
that he had committed a huge blunder. Rather than
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encourage Obama to reverse Bush’s decision to deploy
an anti-missile complex in Eastern Europe, his threat
encouraged Obama to do just the opposite, lest he be
accused of weakness at home. Medvedev’s remarks
were especially gratuitous when it was clear that the
American president-elect had profound reservations
about the prudence of deploying a system that had not
been proven to work against a threat that had not as
yet materialized.91
As the deadline for a START follow-up approached,
Moscow insisted that no cooperative Russian-Western
security system was possible if the United States did
not: (a) scrap the missile shield in Eastern Europe, or
(b) ask Russia to join Washington in the enterprise.
American pundits meanwhile observed that Obama
would not announce a change in U.S. policy regarding
the missile defense system in Europe as long as Russia
showed no sign of blocking the Mullahs’ march toward
a nuclear arsenal. Soon after Obama entered the White
House, the New York Times reported that he wrote a
letter to Medvedev proposing that if Russia helped
curb Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons, the United
States would halt deployment of the missile system in
Eastern Europe. The White House claimed that never
happened.92
The Kremlin insisted that it did not welcome Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons, but it would not join the
United States in aggressive efforts to prevent that
outcome. Russia stood alongside China in refusing
to subject Iran to the pressure required to force it to
comply with UN resolutions demanding it halt its
nuclear weapons program.
American Kremlin-watchers cited the following
observations to account for Russia’s duplicity:
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• It does not view the threat as a near-term
problem and welcomes U.S. frustration in not
checking Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
• It has extensive and profitable commercial
relations with Iran and does not want to halt
them, especially in face of the current global
economic meltdown. Among other things, it has
helped build a nonmilitary nuclear installation
in Bushehr, while it has considered selling
ground-to-air S-300 missiles to Iran.93
• Russia believes it is in its vital strategic interest
to have good relations with the most powerful
state in the Gulf Region, and they enhance the
Kremlin’s efforts to court its own 20-million
Muslim population.
Meanwhile, key members of President Obama's
foreign policy team warned Tehran that if it proceeded
with its nuclear weapons program, the United States
would not take the military option off the table. Iran
treated such threats with derision:
• Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S.
military is overstretched and clearly does not
want to engage in a third war, especially with a
country that has a population of 70 million.
• Short of attacking Iran with nuclear weapons,
the United States does not have the capability to
destroy its myriad and widely dispersed nuclear
installations via air strikes.
• A conventional ground assault is impossible
since the United States does not have the
resources to launch one, and, besides, any
kind of military action against Iran would be
accomplished at great risk: a surge in fighting
in Iraq via insurgents close to Tehran; or,
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Iran’s preventing shipping from carrying oil
from the Persian Gulf to global customers; or,
measures taken to compromise the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan.
An Israeli strike may represent a military option,
but, barring the use of nuclear weapons, it would only
momentarily halt Iranian nuclear operations. At the
same time, even if the United States did not condone
it, Washington would be blamed by the Muslim world
for being complicit in it. Any hope that the Obama
administration would reach out to one billion plus
Muslims then would be dealt a lethal blow, not to
mention the resulting firestorm of upheaval that would
be set loose throughout the Persian Gulf and beyond.
This would be the case even though Sunni leaders wish
to deny Tehran nuclear weapons, because the United
States cannot overlook a compelling observation: The
Sunni ruling elites’ view of this matter may not reflect
that of the “Muslim street.”
The United States then had two options in meeting
Iran’s nuclear threat. The first involved a diplomatic
campaign. Obama entered office knowing that the
diplomatic option was lost in the spring of 2003 when
the Bush administration failed to engage Iran in serious negotiations. The Iranians indicated that they were
prepared to talk about a broad range of issues that
were points of friction between both countries ever
since they halted diplomatic ties in 1979. Secretary of
State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage,
“favored a positive response to the Iranians.” But
they were overruled by Vice-President Cheney and
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld who proclaimed: “We
don’t speak to evil.”94
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President Obama attempted to resume serious talks
with Tehran after he was elected, but his efforts were
greeted with contempt. For example, on the Iranian
New Year he sent congratulations to both Iran’s leaders
and people, but to no effect. Then the bogus election in
Iran, and widespread public expressions of discontent
associated with it along with the brutal oppression of
Iranian protestors, prompted even his supporters to
reject talks with the reactionary Mullahs in Tehran.
The second option, getting Moscow to press the
Iranians to comply with UN resolutions in their drive
for nuclear weapons, did not produce results either.
For the reasons mention above, the Kremlin did not
believe that it was in Russia’s interest to press Iran on
this matter.
Meanwhile, some influential voices in Moscow began to express optimism about reaching an accommodation with Obama on the missile shield in Eastern
Europe. The views of Sergey Rogov are noteworthy.
As director of the Institute for the United States and
Canada, he is well placed to characterize Russian
thinking on this matter. He has noted with optimism
that the Obama administration has eliminated certain
components of a global missile program. Furthermore,
his analysis has prompted him to conclude that the
U.S. NMD project will not “include a space-based
component.” At the same time, growing economic
constraints serve as a rationale for the Americans not
endorsing an expensive missile defense system.
As a consequence, Rogov chides the Russian
mass media for exaggerating the U.S. program.
“Again and again they propagandize the nonexistent
achievements of ‘Star Wars,’ which has long ceased to
exist.” In conclusion, he sees Washington and Moscow
reconciling their differences over NMD.95
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This optimism has found purchase on the American
side. Defense Secretary Gates in his testimony before
the Senate Appropriations Committee—just weeks
before his president was to meet with his Russian
counterpart in Moscow—said: Prime Minister Putin
“basically dismissed the idea that the Iranians would
have a missile that would have the range to reach much
of Western Europe and much of Russia before 2020 or
so. And he showed me a map that his intelligence guys
had prepared. I told him he needed a new intelligence
service.” Gates continued: “The fact of the matter is, the
Russians have come back to us and acknowledged that
we were right in terms of the nearness of the Iranian
missile threat, and that they had been wrong. And so
my hope is we can build on that.”96
On September 17, the U.S. Government announced
that the American missile project in Eastern Europe
had been scrapped in favor of a new system that would
be deployed first at sea and later in the air and on land
with the explicit purpose of meeting the threat of short
and intermediate range Iranian missiles. Gates, who
had previously endorsed the missile site in Eastern
Europe, explained why he had changed his mind. That
system had been designed to deal with the threat of
Iranian ICBMs, but intelligence reports indicated that
they represented a long-term threat. The United States
had to deal with the near-term threat of Iranian short
and intermediate range missiles that were soon to be
operational. What is more, under Bush’s program,
the United States could not achieve protection until
2017, but under the new one, its first phase would be
completed by 2011. At that time, “. . . we will deploy
proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missile weapons
that are growing in capability in the areas where we
see the greatest threat to Europe.” This Aegis system,
Gates stressed, works!97
61

President Obama’s critics charged that he had
adopted this option under pressure from Russia. He
responded, “Russia had always been paranoid about
this [the system in Eastern Europe], but George Bush
was right. This wasn’t a threat to them.” He added, “If
the byproduct of it is that the Russians feel a little less
paranoid and are now willing to work more effectively
with us to deal with threats like ballistic missiles from
Iran or nuclear development in Iran, you know, then,
that’s a bonus.”98
Obama’s Republican opponents charged that the
decision compromised U.S. security, but in fact the
Pentagon was happy about the decision. It was no
secret that the Bush project was ill-conceived and of no
value to U.S. security. The initial response from Russia
also was positive but limited: Putin characterized it
as a brave gesture on Obama’s part, while officials
in Moscow said that Russia would not deploy its
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. But there was no
indication that the Russian government was prepared
to provide Washington with what it wanted most of
all: categorical support for harsh measures to force
Tehran to halt its drive for nuclear weapons. But then
on September 23, as Medvedev was prepared to attend
the UN meeting in New York, he hinted that Russia
might join the United States in this campaign when he
said: “Sanctions are seldom productive, but they are
sometimes inevitable.”99
In conclusion, as is true of NATO enlargement,
reconciling differences over NMD are essential if the
Americans, Europeans, and Russians are to successfully develop a common European security system.
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CFE, OSCE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN A
“TROUBLED NEIGHBORHOOD"
The 5 days of fighting between Georgia and Russia
last year is proof-positive that modern Europe can still
be stricken by war. It also underscores the alarming
prospect of a military confrontation between American
and European forces on the one hand and Russian
fighters on the other. That clearly is a remote prospect,
but it cannot be discounted. It is with this specter in
mind that the capacity of existing arms limitation and
crisis prevention regimes such as CFE and OSCE must
be assessed. Medvedev claims they are dysfunctional
and must be replaced.
What Moscow has called its near abroad but recently labels the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), and officials in Brussels designate as Europe's
“troubled neighborhood” is the focal point of concern.
The countries involved are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine; all are closely
entangled with Russia or rife with internal problems
that promote instability in the region. Armenia and
Azerbaijan, for example, have clashed over NagornoKarabakh, the Armenian enclave embedded within
Azerbaijan. Many people in Moldova have favored
unification with their ethnic cousins in Romania—a
move opposed by the Kremlin—while the Moldovans
have been in conflict with Moscow over the fate
of the Russians who got stranded in the enclave of
Transnistria.100
The West has rejected the pretense that all of them
are in Russia’s sphere of influence and has insisted that
their citizens, and not outsiders, should determine their
security preferences. Brussels, in turn, has engaged
them through its Eastern Partnership Program to
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promote economic and political practices and values
that prevail in Europe, although some in Old Europe
are wary of engaging countries that are in Russia’s
backyard.
The Kremlin cites EU meddling and American
efforts to arm Georgia and court Ukraine as evidence
that Russia’s vested interests in the area are at risk. It
also deems CFE and OSCE as working in favor of the
West’s interest. Medvedev’s case for a new European
security system, however, rests on the observation that
they are dysfunctional and must be replaced.
In response, he has called for “Helsinki Two” to
manage conflict in this area. It is noteworthy that the
Helsinki Accords of 1975 were established at a time
when the United States was in a weakened condition,
and its leaders were chastened by their failed venture
in Vietnam. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why
Moscow today looks upon it with such favor. Andrei
Gromyko, the somber Soviet Foreign Minister, had
lobbied for an East-West accord for years with the
following purposes in mind:
• To secure the legitimacy of Europe's post-World
War II borders. The Kremlin in particular wanted the West to endorse the USSR’s control of
territory that it acquired with Nazi Germany’s
crushing defeat.
• To reduce conflict by resolving any doubts about
the sovereignty of the states in question and to
foreclose revanchist claims that could lead to a
military clash between East and West.
• To promote and safeguard the human rights of
all Europeans. Moscow had to include human
rights provisions in Basket III of the accords
to placate the democracies, but in the opinion
of many Western critics, it had no intention of
honoring them.
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Like the Soviet inhabitants of the Kremlin in 1975,
those working in it today want to find a way to end
border and sovereignty disputes in the post-Soviet
space. In this instance, to create a new Euro-wide
agreement in the hope of halting NATO and EU
enlargement at the expense of territory that Moscow
sees within its sphere of influence. That is why many
Western observers reject Medvedev’s call for a new
European Security Pact.
It is rumored that at his breakfast meeting with
Obama at the Moscow Summit, Putin characterized
what we have called Europe’s troubled neighborhood
as Russia’s sphere of influence. The American President
responded that every country has the right to choose
its own security system.101
At the University of Helsinki on April 20, 2009,
Medvedev reiterated his call for a conference that would
facilitate “multifaceted cooperation among the Russian
Federation, the European Union, and the United States
of America.”102 This comprehensive mutual security
system would reconcile problems that neither NATO
nor the CIS, the EU, or the Common Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) had successfully addressed.
It could be held under the auspices of the OSCE,
but Medvedev reiterated his reservations about
that organization since it only focused “on solving
partial, sometimes even peripheral security issues.”103
Moreover, it has been exploited by the West to apply
democratic standards on Russia that are not always
met in the United States and Europe. Among other
things, Moscow could cite charges coming from within
the American military that claimed human rights
violations were condoned at the highest levels of the
Bush administration.104
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In the case of a new Helsinki gathering, Medvedev
acknowledged that “Such a meeting cannot take place
simply by snapping ones fingers . . .,” and the process
leading up to a new security system would be a long
and difficult one.105 There was the ancillary problem
of it producing high expectations that could not be
quickly met. As an aside, he said that Russia had
reduced its armed forces in Kaliningrad; a gesture, one
might assume, to downplay the intemperate threat that
he directed at Obama the day after the new American
president was elected. Medvedev also observed that
“we would welcome the Alliance's decision to abandon
plans to further strengthen the military capabilities of
the Baltic countries.”106 The inference here was that
Russia had legitimate cause to take military actions
to counter those being contemplated by NATO. Of
course, the audience knew that while the West deemed
the fate of the Balts sealed by their joint membership
in the EU and NATO, Moscow still saw them as part
of the “near abroad.” Also, like their Baltic neighbors,
many Finns cited Russia’s involvement in the Five Day
War as evidence of its revisionist proclivities. Some
therefore concluded that Finland should seek the safety
of NATO membership.
Medvedev added that, “Work on the treaty can also
facilitate another important task, namely the process of
moving towards a world without nuclear weapons.”107
This, no doubt, was an attempt to convince his audience that he was on the same page as the immensely
popular American president, who created a buzz
days earlier with his Prague speech calling for nuclear
disarmament.
In celebrating the Helsinki Final Act, however,
Medvedev ignored Basket III. It focused on Human
Rights and gave rise to Helsinki Watch Groups
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throughout the USSR that contributed to the Soviet
Empire’s demise. In many parts of that empire, the
Accords provided the framework for Popular Front
Movements—for example, in the Baltic Republics as
well as Russia—that mobilized grass roots resistance
to Kremlin rule. American critics that had predicted the
Kremlin would not honor Basket III did not anticipate
that it would encourage human rights movements in
communist Europe. This conclusion had to be reassessed
after Jimmy Carter made human rights an important
element in U.S. foreign policy as did dissidents in the
USSR who adroitly exploited Basket III to advance
their campaign to reduce the oppressive practices of
the Soviet nomenklatura. Indeed, the Soviet Empire was
brought down because of internal factors not pressure
from the outside.108
Today, of course, officials in the Kremlin ignore
issues like democracy and human rights because
Russia’s performance on these matters leaves—to put
it mildly—much to be desired. The same holds true of
Russian commentators who are unaffiliated with their
government.109
Here again it should be restated that while one
can make a powerful case for addressing Medvedev’s
proposal from an agnostic realist perspective, concern
about the absence of democracy and the rule of law
there may result in the Kremlin finding merit to the old
nostrum: Beware what you ask for!
Russian officials stress security measures, but they
cannot silence commentators in the West that press
them on democracy and human rights. As one German
observer has noted: “Revitalizing the OSCE as a security
policy actor without jeopardizing its human dimension
will be difficult in view of the Russian position.”110
She also pinpoints the motives behind Medvedev’s
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proposal; i.e., “weakening the role of NATO within
European security policy.”111 Both factors taken
together provide opponents of Medvedev’s proposal
with ammunition to shoot it down.
Still, she indicates this does not foreclose a
debate over a new security system. “In addition to a
revitalization of the OSCE in terms of security policy, an
enhancement of institutionalized cooperation between
Moscow and Brussels would be a major step forward
for European security.”112 In this connection, the debate
over the future of OSCE clearly will be tied to the role
that the EU can play in promoting conflict management
in Europe. In sum, issues linked to Europe’s troubled
neighborhood may best be addressed by the EU rather
than NATO or the United States.
EU peacekeepers and European civilian personnel
can play a pivotal role in working with Russia to
reduce tensions in this troubled neighborhood. Such
cooperation should be part of a larger effort to develop
an EU approach to a range of agreements between
Brussels and Moscow. A big question mark here,
however, is can the EU demonstrate a greater unity
of purpose in its relations with Russia than has been
true up to this point? Friction between Old and New
Europe over how to approach Russia has proven to be
a major obstacle to a common European approach to
Moscow on a host of matters. The dispute over energy
is beyond the scope of this monograph, but Europe’s
approach to it is a case in point. Many observers of the
EU have complained that rather than adopt a common
unified position, bilateral agreements between the
several states and Russia have prevailed.113
At the same time Nicu Popescu and Andrew
Wilson note that Brussels has done little to address
the many varied problems of the states in the region
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through its Eastern Neighborhood project. “While the
EU frustrates neighbourhood governments with its
bureaucracy, Russia offers straightforward benefits
such as visa-free travel and cheap energy.”114
It is noteworthy, however, that while they claim
that Russia hopes “to rebuild its sphere of influence
and to undermine the sovereignty of the eastern
neighborhood states. . . .,”115 they endorce Medvedev’s
plan. In their view, “The EU should support cooperation with Russia in the neighborhood where
possible: it should, for example, publicly back
President Medvedev’s proposals for discussions on
‘new European security architecture,’ first floated in
June 2008.”116
That same proposal, however, has been greeted
with alarm and suspicion in New Europe where leaders deem the Germans and Italians too accommodating
to Russia’s aggressive behavior. Also, as Vygaudas
Usackas, Lithuania’s foreign minister, has observed,
“The West has no grand strategy but Russia does.”117
His fear that the chess masters in Moscow will
outmaneuver the Americans and Europeans in the
process of seeking security cooperation throughout
New Europe.
For the welfare of the European project, and as a
necessary requirement for a unified approach to Russia,
the British, French, and Germans in particular must
acknowledge and address the fissures separating Old
and New Europe—dangerous points of discord that
appear to be growing in magnitude. The success of the
Euro-skeptics in the recent elections to the European
parliament provides further incentive for the EU to
address growing fissures between the two components
of Europe.
For its part, the Obama administration must
address fears abroad in New Europe that American69

Russian reconciliation suggests another Yalta is in
the works. In a run-up to the July Moscow Summit,
Obama received a letter from several iconic leaders
from Eastern Europe—including Vaclav Havel and
Lech Walesa—that expressed concerns about a reset of
American-Russian relations. They said they welcomed
them but warned against his making concessions to
Moscow at their expense. “Our hopes that relations
with Russia would improve and that Moscow would
finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and
independence after joining NATO and the EU have not
been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back on as a revisionist
power pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics and methods.”118 They observed, “Today
the concern is, for example, that the United States
and the major European powers might embrace the
Medvedev plan for a ‘Concert of Powers’ to replace the
continent's existing, value-based security structure.”119
The second institutional arrangement that includes
all of the former Warsaw Pact countries and those in
NATO is the CFE. NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations
regarding a conventional arms control agreement
began with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
Talks (MBFR) in 1973, but they did not get anywhere
until the 1990 CFE Treaty. Signed in November, it set
equal limits on main battle tanks, armored combat
vehicles (ACVs), artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and
attack helicopters in several flank zones that covered
territory running from the Atlantic to the Urals. Its
purpose was to promote regional stability by placing
limits on conventional weapons there and consequently
promote trust on the part of all who signed it.
NATO has characterized CFE as the cornerstone of
European security and holds that if relevant changes
are made to update it, CFE can continue to do so.
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It has reduced an arms race in Europe, increased
transparency, enhanced conventional deterrence, and
in the final analysis has resulted in the destruction of
thousands of pieces of equipment.
Acknowledging the post-Cold War period necessitated revisions, all 30 CFE states in 1996 agreed to
a review conference with the purpose in mind of
reappraising the flank map. Many of Russia’s complaints were addressed in 1999 when major changes
were adopted at Istanbul. The adapted treaty replaced
the bloc and zone weapons limits with national and
territorial arms ceilings. They would be lowered, but
actual deployments were already below allowed limits
and Russia was permitted more ACVs in its Northern
and Southern flanks than called for in the original
treaty.
Some American analysts still believe that it is an
important and relevant agreement and can be updated
to meet the challenges of today’s world. To date, 4,000
on-site visits have been conducted; vast amounts of
data have been collected; 58,000 pieces of equipment
have been destroyed, and limits for five major weapons
remain in place, along with requirements to announce
troop movements.120 Some say the treaty did more to
promote crisis prevention than did actual reductions:
for example, it helped assuage concerns about German
reunification by providing for the transfer of Soviet
forces from Eastern Europe in an open fashion. In 1995,
under CFE provisions, Russian concerns about the
ultimate goal of U.S. troop movements in the Balkans
were reduced because Moscow had the opportunity
to inspect them. Finally, it is no small thing that CFE
provides for predictability and transparency in the
troubled neighborhood of Europe.
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To avoid the treaty’s total collapse, NATO proposed
in March 2008 to have its members ratify the process
while Russia honored its commitments and withdrew
troops from several restricted areas. Once the adapted
treaty was in place, Russia’s complaints would be
met. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would ratify it,
and NATO would address Moscow’s concerns about
the three flank zones—the Baltic States, Turkey, and
Norway—where it has problems under the CFE
guidelines. Proponents of CFE had warned that without them, Europe's security would be undermined and
new lines of division would be drawn.
Critics of CFE argue that it is a relic of the Cold War
and no longer has a place in the existing environment.
What is more, Vladimir Socor observes that Russia has
not honored its obligations under CFE for years, while
at the same time getting the West to accept its ongoing
breaches. During the Chechen wars in the 1990s,
Russia was granted a temporary exemption from CFE
restrictions in the Northern Caucasus. Moscow also
has violated the treaty in Transnistria and Armeniancontrolled areas of Azerbaijan with the deployment
of heavy weapons and with disregard for verification
procedures. It has illegally maintained troops in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.121
The Russian perspective on CFE has also been less
than positive, and that explains why Putin formally
withdrew from it in 2007. For years, Russia complained
about flank limitations in Northwest Russia and the
Caucasus and claimed the treaty placed Russia in a
position of inferiority. More recently, it has observed
that equipment limitations that were assigned to
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries now
are allotted to those associated with NATO. Therefore
Sergey Kislak, Russia’s ambassador to the United States,

72

contends that there is an imbalance in conventional
assets. For example, none of the Baltic countries have
signed the adaptive treaty and can do anything they
want in the areas of weapons deployments—this
is unfair. What is more, Kislak says that Russia has
lived up to all of the provisions of the adapted treaty
including the removal of all treaty limited equipment
(TLE) from Moldova. And while it has removed its
bases from Georgia, the Georgians have not lived up
to the treaty.122
America’s European allies were stunned in August
2008 when Russian forces crossed into Georgia. As a
consequence, the cavalier attitude toward CFE was
replaced by the thought that conventional war on the
continent was not beyond the realm of possibility.
Defense analysts, therefore, had to ask whether they
were prepared to deal with that disturbing possibility.
A group of experts from America, Europe, and
Russia under the auspices of the East-West Institute
have released a report about CFE that concludes: “The
treaty . . . remains a useful instrument for strengthening
confidence in Europe. It is vitally necessary and
beneficial to all parties involved to preserve the benefits
of the CFE treaty.”123 Also, “Russia and the United States
have been working more than a year on a project of a
‘package deal’ for solving problems related to revival
of conventional arms control regimes in Europe. This
process should be radically accelerated.”124
Some of the experts, however, conclude that the
CFE Treaty has outlived its usefulness.125 And perhaps
the time has come for a moratorium on this matter.
Does it make any sense to talk about restoring CFE as
long as the crises in Georgia and Ukraine are boiling?
The same holds true for the frozen crises in Moldova,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. Is it logical
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to resurrect this treaty and cover the same area that
was originally covered? How can the West go along
with a new CFE if the Russians do not leave Moldova?
And also, how can Russia truly abide by a revision
of CFE when it faces mounting violence throughout
the North Caucasus? Before efforts to revitalize CFE
move forward, all of these points of friction must be
resolved.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Government must help establish a new
framework for security cooperation in Europe that
includes Russia. It is a pathway to stability on the
Continent and will advance America’s vital global
priorities: among other things, combating terrorism,
and curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
to rogue states and terrorist cells. It will promote
cooperation in other vital areas that are beyond the
purview of this monograph: energy security, climate
change, a new global economic regime, the stabilization
of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encouraging North
Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons in compliance
with international resolutions.
That said, a pivotal question remains unanswered:
How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto
in a new European security system? In contrast to
Medvedev’s proposal, this monograph has evaluated
the relevant details bearing on the prospects of
extensive West-Russian security cooperation. It
concludes that the most likely pathway to success is
not a Grand Summit along the lines of a 19th century
Concert of Europe that appeared in the aftermath
of the Napoleonic Wars. It is rather a step-by-step
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approach that rests on the conviction that a successful
outcome to the START negotiations will produce a
thaw in West-Russian relations and inspire confidence
to reconcile differences over critical points of friction.
Toward this end, the time has come to think beyond
Cold War stereotypes and provide Russia with a NATO
Membership Action Plan.
START.
In considering the U.S. position on reaffirming a
strategic nuclear balance with Russia, the following
are recommended:
• A concerted effort must be made to reach an
agreement by the December 2009 deadline. It
is true that START can be extended, but it is
uncertain what the future will hold, so the two
governments should move with alacrity to find
a solution by the expiration date.
• Issues that are extraneous to START like NMD
and space weapons should not be part of the
negotiations because if they are, efforts to reach
an agreement may be prolonged or even result
in failure.
• The United States should accept Russia’s
preference for a law-based treaty and not a
political arrangement. This is the position of
Republican Senator Richard Lugar, one of the
authentic nuclear arms experts in Congress,
and it appears to be one that the Obama
administration can live with.
• START verification procedures should be adopted albeit in a less complicated form. There
appears to be little disagreement on this matter,
although the Russian side has indicated that it
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has concerns about the meaning of transparency.
• Ambassador Linton Brooks, a leading expert
on START, has observed that the United States
should not tangle with Russia over the matter
of conventional strategic forces, but simply
count them.126 If Washington did so, one of the
Russians’ major areas of opposition would be
taken off the table.
There are other outstanding issues that must be
resolved, such as the number of delivery systems
to be counted and differences over whether or not
nuclear arms should be placed in storage or destroyed.
Most observers believe they will be resolved, given
the fact that a reaffirmation of the American-Russian
strategic nuclear balance is in the vital interest of both
sides. Also, measures to reduce the hair-trigger status
of existing American and Russian nuclear systems
must be adopted as soon as possible, and both sides
must work toward the elimination of MIRVs in their
arsenals.
Finally, the United States and Europe must address
Moscow’s concerns that neighbors outside of Europe
are gaining an edge in intermediate-ranged missiles at
Russia’s expense, and it may be necessary to give the
INF Treaty another look. But Russia, in turn, must join
the United States in dramatically reducing the tactical
nuclear weapons that both sides possess: in Russia’s
case, about 2,000 to 3,000 deployed weapons, while the
United States has 1,000 of them in this configuration.
Each side has many more in storage. One of the major
roadblocks to the reduction of these weapons is that
Moscow deems them insurance since its conventional
capability has declined dramatically in the aftermath
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of the USSR’s demise. Another one is Russia’s assertion
that it will not reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal as
long as the Americans do not withdraw their tactical
nukes from Europe. The bottom line then is that both
countries must place these weapons on the agenda
when they meet in 2010 in Washington to discuss the
future of their respective nuclear forces.127
If the START negotiations are a success, there
will be a surge in trust that may provide pathways to
cooperation on other existing points of discord between
Russia and the West.
The U.S. Missile Site in Eastern Europe.
It is premature to assume that American-Russian
differences over a Europe missile shield have disappeared with Obama’s scrapping of Bush’s project in
Eastern Europe. On September 23, he announced that
U.S. intelligence, in league with its British and French
colleagues, had uncovered a secret Iranian uranium
enrichment site outside of Qom. That gave new urgency
to the campaign to address the Iran Question. Earlier
that week in anticipation of that revelation, the Iranians
had sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy
Agency informing it of the installation, but said that
it had nothing to do with nuclear weapons. American
journalists first reported that the Russians were angry
that they had been blindsided by their Iranian friends,
and that Moscow was prepared to join the Americans,
British, French and Germans in taking harsh measures
against Tehran.128
But in a matter of hours Russian foreign minister
Lavrov made a u-turn and scolded Russia’s partners
for not sharing the information with Moscow
beforehand. The notion that the Kremlin would join
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the West in taking tough measures against Iran then
was reconsidered. The October 1 meeting that took
place between Iranian officials and the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council plus Germany has
left uncertainty in its wake. Only time will tell whether
or not Tehran will ultimately halt its drive for nuclear
weapons.
The prospect of East-West cooperating on a missile
defense system as suggested by NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also remains in
doubt.129 In spite of this murky situation, and assuming
Moscow accepts Obama’s Aegis-based missile shield
project, the issue of meeting the challenge of Iran’s
ICBMs remains to be addressed. Toward this end,
the United States should welcome Russia’s support
in creating a missile defense system that protects all
parties concerned from a rogue ICBM threat.
• Russia has gifted scientists and technicians
that have achieved a solid record of space
accomplishments. In recent years, American
astronauts have relied heavily upon the Russian
space station to conduct their work. The United
States should explore the prospect of exploiting
the Russian radars at Gabara in Russia and
Armavir in Azerbaijan to develop an antiballistic missile system that protects America
and Europe.
• Cooperation on this front would go a long way
in reducing fears in Russia about America’s
developing an anti-missile system at its
expense.
• Once Russia found that the Western nations
were genuinely interested in such cooperation,
it would be under mounting pressure to work
with the international community in halting
Tehran’s drive for a nuclear arsenal.
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• Should Russia reject participation, that move
would provide new clarity to questions about
the prospects of cooperating with Moscow on
mutual security concerns.
Finally, the Obama administration must convince
the New Europeans that reconciliation of the NMD
dispute with Russia will not detract from their security.
It does not presage a replay of Yalta, but instead
promotes harmony between the West and Russia;
that effort is in the vital national interest of all parties
concerned. That said, Ann Applebaum blames the
Obama administration for not adequately forewarning
the New Europeans that it was renouncing the missile
site in Eastern Europe. There was not strong support
for the system in either the Czech Republic or Poland,
but Washington’s abrupt turn-about fed fears in both
countries that the United States and Russia had cut
a deal with little regard for their opinion.130 In short,
the new team in Washington was demonstrating the
same kind of disregard for its European allies that
was characteristic of the Bush administration. Clearly,
the Obama administration must keep in mind that
the concerns that the New Europeans express about
their large neighbor to the East have a basis in fact and
cannot be blithely ignored by Washington.
Europe’s “Troubled Neighborhood”: CFE and
OSCE.
The CFE has diminished in effectiveness since the
USSR’s demise: the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
and the enlargement of NATO, the Five Day War, and
disputes over energy and the economic and political
crises that afflict the former Soviet states. To talk
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about its resurrection then appears to be a walk in
the dark. Perhaps over time more light will be shed
on the myriad areas of confusion that are associated
with CFE. A successful follow-up to START may be
helpful since it promotes greater trust on all sides.
Nonetheless, ongoing tensions between Russia and
Georgia and friction between Moscow and Kiev, not to
mention the upheaval that exists in the other countries
that are part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program
will serve as barriers to its resurrection. Still the U.S.
Government and its allied partners, in conjunction
with Russia, must work toward a conventional forces
agreement that provides the kind of transparency and
sharing of information that was a hallmark of CFE for
years.
Russia has demonstrated its unhappiness with
OSCE by expelling its personnel from the breakaway
Georgian enclave of South Ossetia in violation of
the September 7-8, 2008, agreement with the EU. In
opposition to all of the other OSCE countries (56 in all),
it has recognized Abkhazia as independent of Georgian
sovereignty and has vetoed further UN operations in
Abkhazia.
Nonetheless, given the existing tensions, the United
States should encourage the EU, the UN, OSCE, and
all parties concerned in the Georgian-Russian crisis
“to take immediate measures to conclude legally
binding agreements on nonuse of force between sides
of the conflict; to exclude provocative military actions,
and to resolve on a compromise basis the problem of
monitoring the security and military situation.”131
At the same time, “As NATO expansion into the
region seems to be on the back-burner, the EU should
step up its role in the region’s many actual and potential
security crises.”132 Under Sweden’s EU presidency, one
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can expect Stockholm to press for greater interaction
between it and Europe’s troubled neighborhood.
Brussels should do so while seeking closer cooperation
with Russia on a host of fronts that NATO is poorly
designed to handle because they largely are diplomatic
and political in nature. In line with this thinking,
Germany has proposed that Russia be included in
the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood Project. For its part,
Washington should welcome any effort that the EU
embarks upon to work closely with Moscow. Many
in the Kremlin favor this relationship since the U.S.NATO combination signifies hard power, while the
EU is seen in terms of soft power.
To a significant degree, whether or not the EU
develops a common unified approach to Russia
depends largely upon one country—Germany.
American defense analysts do not spend much time
thinking about Germany, but they should if they
want to seriously study Europe’s future. The Germans
enjoy a special relationship with the Russians, and
many observers believe that if its political leaders and
industrial chiefs decided to adopt a common rather
than a bilateral approach to relations with Russia, the
EU’s efforts to confront Moscow as a unified entity
would be given a stiff shot in the arm. Ever since the
energy shut-down early in 2009, however, the EU has
been in a quandary on this matter.133
Meanwhile, the German government and business
elite—the latter through the East Commission of
German Business—have become even more assertive
in developing closer commercial ties with Russia. In
addition to Germany’s dependence upon Russian
energy, Russia has become an expanding market for
German exports. This development has gained added
significance in light of the current economic crisis
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that has hurt Germany as well as other European
countries.
On July 16, at Munich, President Medvedev and
Chancellor Merkel conducted their biannual talks to
find ways to do even more profitable business, including “a credit of 500 million Euros to finance Russian
purchases, mainly of German industrial installations
and machinery.”134 This special relationship has the
capacity to advance or hamper a common EU approach
to Russia. The same could be said for NATO and efforts
to cement security cooperation between Moscow and
the democracies.
But Washington must first press the reset button to
improve relations with Berlin that have been sullied
over differences associated with Iraq and Afghanistan,
the proper response to the global economic crisis, as
well as conflicting views regarding relations with
Moscow. To promote more harmonious relations with
the largest and richest country in Europe, the United
States should develop a special working group with
Germany to resolve—or at least mollify—outstanding
differences between both countries. Washington, in
short, must acknowledge that it must reengage Berlin
at the same time that it resumes relations with
Moscow.
A common Western approach to relations with
Russia, of course, has been hampered by a profound
value gap that divides the Europeans and Americans.
Ironically, historians may one day observe that it was
a rancorous struggle over universal health care in the
United States that underscored the fact that the American and European models of democracy and social and
economic justice are at odds in many pertinent areas.
Europeans cannot fathom that the Americans still have
not acknowledged that universal health care is a basic

82

human right, while they abhor the U.S. gun culture and
cannot understand how prominent political leaders in
the world’s most scientifically advanced society can
ignore the existential threat of global warming.
Meanwhile, a significant proportion of the American public characterizes the Europeans and their
collectivist practices in similar unfavorable terms. It is
the view through this prism of conflicting worldviews
that has hampered the Americans and Europeans in
their quest to find common ground on security matters
now that the communist menace no longer provides
them with a common threat around which to rally.
Another barrier to a uniform approach to Russia is
the growing and ominous division between Old and
New Europe regarding relations with Moscow. The
Old Europeans dismiss the recalcitrance of the Poles,
Balts et al. toward Russia as reason not to pay attention
to their complaints that the EU has been caving into
Moscow’s demands. The latter, in turn, despair that
their colleagues in Old Europe do not fathom that Russia has exploited its energy assets to compromise their
very sovereignty. Moreover, they find it alarming that
their French and Germans neighbors have so quickly
dismissed Russian aggression in Georgia and have
ignored their concern about Medvedev’s observation
that a vital element of Russian defense doctrine is to
protect Russians who live in the near abroad. And
when Moscow takes active measures to compromise
the Ukrainian government, they deem that gross
interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring
democracy as cause for alarm. From the perspective of
NATO’s most recent members, then, it is not the time
to promote more extensive cooperation with Moscow.
It is with these observations in mind that Old and
New Europe will respond to Medvedev’s security
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proposal from conflicting perspectives. The EU
countries must find a way to reconcile their differences
on these important matters and confront Russia in a
resolute united front. That effort will be complicated by
growing divisions within the EU and the rise of Euroskeptics that challenge the viability of the European
Project. Washington therefore should employ its
influence to help bring about reconciliation between
the warring factions in the EU. It may be limited, but
failure to do so will encourage those in Moscow who
believe that Russia should drive a wedge between the
Americans and Europeans and between the Old and
New Europeans. Under these circumstances, a new
cold war could materialize.
NATO Enlargement.
In considering the prospects for a new European
Security System, the future of NATO must be the
central focus of interest. Every country in Europe that
wishes to join NATO—including Russia—should be
given the opportunity to do so, assuming they meet
the qualifications of membership. Indeed, through
NATO we may find an answer to the question: How
do we give Russia a voice and not a veto in European
security affairs? Ever since Medvedev proclaimed last
summer that it was time to craft a post-9-11 security
architecture for Europe, this question has become a
hot topic of debate. As yet, no one has answered it. It
is obvious that the NATO-Russian Council does not
offer one; something far more comprehensive and
substantial is required.
At the same time, nothing that Medvedev has
mentioned provides an answer. Clearly a Grand
Summit along the lines of the 19th century Concert
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of Europe that materialized in the aftermath of the
Napoleonic Wars is out of the question. But there is a
simple solution to the problem: Offer Russia a NATO
MAP that is especially designed for it. It is obvious that
Russia has the capacity to meet one of the MAPs most
consequential goals: enhancing the alliance’s ability to
project its power. In short, unlike some countries that
gained membership in the first and second round of
enlargement, Russia has the means to be a security
producer and not a security consumer. An intimate
relationship between Russia and the democracies may
surge in importance, moreover, should NATO fail
to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. That
outcome could have a decidedly negative impact upon
stability in the vital energy-rich Central Asian region,
and it would provide a powerful incentive for NATORussian security cooperation there.
Not very long ago most Western analysts would
consider a MAP for Russia unthinkable, but that is no
longer the case as support for it is mounting. It is by
no means overwhelming, but a range of prominent
Western analysts and statesmen have endorsed the
idea: In addition to scholars like Ash, Mandelbaum,
Anders, and Kupchan, former U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker is in this camp—albeit with some reservations—and so is former German Foreign Minister
Joshka Fisher.
Fisher argues the time has come for Russia to be
integrated into a European security system, but notes
that Putin is sadly mistaken if he believes that goal will
be accomplished with a rollback of NATO. Since NATO
is indispensable for the vast majority of Europeans and
for America, that option is out. What Russia should
do instead is to work for NATO membership; Fisher
observes that “such a bold step would transform
NATO. But it would transform Russia even more.”135
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NATO has the capacity to provide a venue for
collective security and power-sharing, while at the
same time resolving flash points of potential conflict
in Europe’s eastern neighborhood. Russia embedded
in NATO would provide a framework to address all
the other points of discord that have been the focus
of this monograph—reconciling differences over
missile defense and finding a replacement for, or the
restoration of, CFE and OSCE. Membership would reduce Moscow’s ardor for confrontation with Georgia.
Indeed, Russia’s and Georgia’s memberships could
represent a package deal.
Since Georgia has already been moving through the
process, it would be expected to find a home in NATO
before Russia did, but the promise of membership for
Moscow might dampen its concerns about Georgia
in NATO. Much the same could be said for Ukraine
entering the alliance.
In considering NATO membership for Russia, the
following observations are in order:
• Given Russia’s size and complexity plus obvious
barriers to membership, it will be some time
before the process is completed. As things stand
today, it is difficult to argue that it measures up
to the democratic and human rights principles
that are requirements for membership.136 But
that should not prevent the process from
beginning because, even if incomplete, it could
produce some positive results. As indicated,
there are compelling reasons to work with
Russia in finding ways to stabilize Europe and
assist NATO in its out of area operations. By
allowing both lethal and nonlethal material to be
transported through its territory to Afghanistan,
Russia is providing a concrete example of how
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it can enhance NATO security objectives, while
saving it tens of millions of dollars and a safer
route for resupply. Of course, Russia has real
cause to fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan
since that outcome would cause trouble for its
Central Asia neighbors and indirectly for itself
as well.
As part of a step-by-step process in meeting
MAP requirements, Russia will have to remove
its troops from areas where they were not
stationed before the Five Day War, and EU
peacekeepers and OSCE civilian monitors will
replace or join them. Moscow also must resume
relations with whoever is the legal authority in
the Georgian government.
Similar efforts will be undertaken to reduce
tensions between Moscow and Kiev, and with
the prospect of Russia in NATO, opinion in
Ukraine may dramatically shift in favor of its
membership as well. At the same time, as Russia
complies with MAP requirements and tensions
subside, that outcome may have a positive effect
upon the political situation within Ukraine—
that is, help to stabilize the situation there. (One
could anticipate the same bonus in Georgia.)
With Russia on its way into NATO, the activities
of CFE and OSCE may be assumed within the
MAP process.
With the EU playing a leading role but with
the cooperation of NATO, measures will be
undertaken to reconcile EU-Russian differences
over the future of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
and Moldova.
In the final stages of the process, steps will be
taken to determine how NATO and Russian
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forces may be placed under a common command
structure, how they can develop a common
strategic doctrine, and how they might resolve
the problem of the interoperability of weapons.
Arranging for Russia to join NATO will be a
difficult enterprise, and much preparation will be
involved before the multitude of complex issues
associated with it are resolved. Among other things,
the New Europeans may block membership for their
large Eastern neighbor. In this connection, they can
cite the mounting tensions between Kiev and Moscow
that were punctuated in the summer by President
Medvedev’s public denouncement of the Ukrainian
government, claiming that it had adopted anti-Russian
policies. Other Russian commentators reaffirmed the
charge that members of the Ukrainian military had
fought along side of the Georgians in the Five Day War
and urged the Kremlin to endorse the separatist claims
of Russians in the Crimea. Consequently, Washington
will have a daunting job selling the MAP proposal to
them.137
The matter of a Russian veto will come up;
conceivably it can be resolved by creating a voting
system in NATO that rests on majority (weighted)
voting. Russia, in short, will not have a veto, but the
same will hold true for the other members. Without
question, the issue of how other major powers may
respond to this new alliance, such as China and India,
must be addressed. And, of course, there will be serious
concerns expressed among Western publics about an
Article Five guarantee to Russia when it confronts so
many threats to its security from within and outside of
the country.
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Even if the NATO members reach a consensus,
the Russian leadership may brusquely reject the offer,
asserting that it is too big to share the same privileges,
for example, as tiny Estonia. Moreover, it enjoys a
unique position in the world: Its awesome nuclear
arsenal comes to mind along with its strategic location
and veto in the UN Security Council. The Russian
military establishment will take the lead in opposing
membership along with those hardliners who are
entrenched in the Kremlin. All indications are that the
present Kremlin leadership will say “thank you, but
no thank you.”138 That said, the following cannot be
forgotten.
Late in 1991, Boris Yeltsin “stunned a NATO meeting by sending a letter with this unilateral declaration.
‘Today we are raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO’.”139 What is more, in his first interview
with a foreign journalists in March 2000, Putin said, “We
believe we can talk about more profound integration
with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal
partner.”140 Later Putin changed his mind, presumably
because he concluded that the West was not prepared
to deal with Russia as an equal.
Here again, if the Kremlin rejects the offer, it will
be difficult to complain that it has been denied a real
voice in European security affairs. NATO membership
will give Russia a louder voice in them than any other
option under consideration. Also, Kremlin strategists
cannot deny that closer cooperation with the West will
enhance Russia’s security, while further isolation will
produce just the opposite outcome. Economic logic,
geography, and shared cultural and ethnic bonds are in
keeping with this conclusion, as well as recent dramatic
changes in global affairs. Without dismissing Russia’s
commercial and other ties to the countries to its south
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and east, the recent economic shock has forced the
Kremlin leadership to acknowledge that it cannot hope
to achieve economic prosperity unless it diversifies its
economy and, among other things, that means relying
upon Europe for capital and technological know-how.
Russia must acknowledge that NATO is really the only
game in town when it comes to an existing security
institution that can stabilize Europe. The CIS clearly
cannot be relied upon to safeguard Russia’s security
interests. In Paul Gobles’ words: “The economic
crisis in the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet
states may finally lead to the complete collapse of the
Commonwealth of Independent States because, in the
absence of agreement on a common plan of action, the
number of conflicts among its members is growing. .
. .”141 It is noteworthy that none of the USSR’s former
republics have recognized the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, the Five Day War has
made Russia’s neighbors feel uneasy, and they have
been looking toward the EU and NATO with a new
sense of urgency. Not too long ago, Russian-watchers
deemed it only a matter of time before Belarus’
Alexander Lukashenko embraced his large neighbor
in a union arrangement. But of late, the last dictator in
Europe has been earnestly courting a close association
with the West, and at times has been decidedly cool in
his dealings with Moscow. In June, a U.S. congressional
delegation met with him, and in August, Philip Gordon,
the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
did as well, demonstrating that a more harmonious
relationship between Washington and Minsk may be
in the offing. Equally disturbing to Moscow is that
while it has been conventional wisdom for years that
Armenia will always look to Russia to protect it against
its Turkish and Azerbaijani neighbors, the Armenian
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government awarded Georgia’s Saakashvilli with
a Medal of Honor. When the CIS states snub a close
association with the men in the Kremlin, Moscow must
seek other ways to restore Russian power, and NATO
may help in that quest. The unipolar American moment
may be history, but so is the Russian imperial project.
During the long-MAP period, Russia can resolve
difficulties that it has with its Far Eastern Neighbors
that are linked to its NATO membership. Furthermore,
that status will enhance its stature among all of its
neighbors so that it has a stronger hand to play when
it faces stiff pressure to make humiliating concessions
to Beijing. Forward-looking Russian strategists cannot
ignore the daunting prospect that, unless Russia fully
engages the West, it may suffer territorial losses,
much as the USSR did—for example, in its Far Eastern
Territories. Whatever Moscow’s relations with China,
its national security community cannot ignore Beijing’s
potential for challenging Russia for influence in the Far
East. This holds true even if some Western analysts
may be engaging in fanciful thinking when they
envisage a Sino-Russian war. Still Russia cannot rest
easy as the Chinese economy surges ahead of its own.
Unless Russia diversifies its economy, it will become,
in the piquant words of Moscow University’s Nikolai
Svanidze, “a cheap Chinese gas station.”142
Kremlin supporters note that Putin’s and
Medvedev’s popularity remains high, but many ordinary Russians have begun to complain about their
government’s inability to provide them with economic
stability. According to a 2008-09 survey of the Levada
Center, the numbers of Russians who say, yes, Russia
is on the right track, have slipped from 59 percent to
41 percent. With mounting economic bad news, the
chorus of opposition to the status quo is growing, and
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the Kremlin now faces a fork in the road. One path is
to dismiss the West, while the other is to take the road
to greater integration with it.143
In face of real efforts at cooperation on the West’s
part, the Russian people will ultimately find the claims
of the hardliners that the West is the enemy inconsistent
with existing facts on the ground. Finding ways to
cooperate with Russia will also indicate to those
living under the existing autocracy—but who desire
democracy—that the West has not forgotten them.
Finally, in meeting MAP requirements, the Kremlin
will ultimately be required to reduce the barriers to
pluralism that presently exists in Russia if it wants to
enter NATO as a full-blown member.
But what about the Western reaction to a MAP for
Russia, in particular, concern about the persistence
of wholesale anti-democratic practices? It would
be foolhardy not to acknowledge the ability of the
value-gap to hamper cooperation with Russia, but the
West, including the United States, has not allowed
China’s sullied human rights record and contempt
for democracy to halt cooperation with Beijing. In this
connection, President Ronald Reagan demonstrated
that Washington can press an opponent—in this
instance the Soviet Union—on its dismal human
rights record, while at the same time finding areas of
cooperation with it. One might deem that practice as
hypocritical, but in the final analysis it was good for the
American and Soviet people and the world at large.
The United States must remain resolute in honoring
its fundamental values. However, in the Hobbesian
world of international politics, it is a mistake to adopt
rigid positions that clash with the compulsion of vital
interests. Yes, a world of democracies is preferable
to the international system that exists today, but
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America’s vital interests cannot be safeguarded without
the assistance of other major global powers, including
those that do not subscribe to our democratic ideals.
There is a consensus in Brussels and Washington that
something must be done to find a new security balance
in Europe. That will not happen if Russia is denied a
role in this enterprise.
In conclusion, the U.S. defense community must
consider the following three outcomes in assessing the
problems and prospects of security cooperation with
Russia:
• The first outcome takes two paths: The successful
negotiation of the follow-up to START promotes
a climate of trust that eventually leads to
the reconciliation of other issues that divide
the West and Russia—that is, NMD, NATO
enlargement, and finding replacements for CFE
and OSCE. This clearly is the best-case scenario,
but it is unlikely to happen in one fell swoop. A
companion outcome is that after the Americans
and Russians succeed in finding a replacement
for START, other avenues of cooperation will
open up, such as cooperation on NMD. A MAP
membership for Russia may be assessed against
this second pathway to cooperation.
• A starker outcome involves the failure to achieve
a successful follow-up to START that leaves all
of the outstanding points of conflict between the
West and Russia unresolved or even a greater
source of contention than presently is the case.
Some in New Europe fear that in contrast to
the West, the Kremlin leaders are master chess
players and have mapped out a grand strategy
that will result in a favorable outcome for Russia
at the expense of the democracies. But there is
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reason, instead, to fear that Russia has no grand
strategy that is based upon reality—rather what
serves that purpose suffers from a disconnect
between reality and fanciful thinking. If this
debilitating condition persists, the outcome
may be dangerous for the Russian people and
their neighbors as well.
• The worst case scenario that some commentators
in the West and Russia deem plausible is Russia’s
failure to sustain political stability and economic
prosperity, leading to its loosing control of much
of its territory, if not a total collapse of power.
Here the template is the demise of the USSR.
What we see is not only a Russia that finds it
impossible to develop a meaningful security
partnership with the West, much less accept a
MAP, but one that is approaching a failed-state
condition of anarchy or serious governmental
dysfunction that results in Russia losing de
facto, if not de jure, much of its territory.
It behooves the U.S. defense community, then,
to consider future force structures, weapon systems
procurement, and strategy and tactics with these three
outcomes in mind. The wars in the Greater Middle
East, of course, now preoccupy American strategists,
but they cannot lose sight of the following observation:
Russia is a country with a nuclear strike force that
approaches that of the United States, and most of the
world’s population and resources exist in and around
its territory. Changes that occur within it will have
profound consequences for American global military
planning, and they deserve our close attention.
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